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A Study of Occurrence Rates of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) to Aircraft With a Focus on HIRF (External) High Intensity Radiated Fields

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

During the decade of the 80's, digital technology has made rapid advances in automating the command, control, and communications functions in modern commercial aircraft [Stix 1991]. The most recent advances include:

- Cockpit Automation: Advanced displays, Side-Stick Controllers, Moving-map displays, collision-avoidance, flight-management.
- Flight Control: "Fly by wire", the use of digital computers that send commands via wires to control the aircraft.
- Navigation: Satellite global positioning, Microwave landing.

These advances in electronics have made for complicated cockpits and the potential for subtle problems. Modern digital systems have been found to be more sensitive to external electromagnetic interference (EMI) than their analog predecessors. The problem is clearly summarized in Meissner 1989: "Recently, the growing concern of upset to flight-critical, fly-by-wire (FBW) control systems in military aircraft has been highlighted in technical journals and the media by reports of high-energy radio frequency (RF) (HIRF) fields insidiously inducing control-system failures that resulted in loss of aircraft and life." Currently the acronym HIRF is used, meaning high intensity radiated fields, or high intensity radio frequency interference or high intensity electromagnetic radiation fields [CKC Labs., 1991]. This study has been supported by NASA Langley to develop information on the nature of HIRF, its frequency of occurrence, and the consequences of HIRF upsets.

Since there are several sources of EMI an additional discussion of terminology is in order. A block diagram is given in Fig. 1.1 which presents the terms in a hierarchy. Modern aircraft can be affected by a variety of different <u>Electromagnetic Interference</u>, EMI, as shown in the top of the diagram. Three important subclasses are: on-board systems, passenger carry-on devices, and externally generated.

When on-board systems interfere with one another this is often called <u>electromagnetic</u> <u>compatibility</u>, EMC. This category also includes problems due to malfunctions within the system in question. The passenger carry-on devices include disc and tape players, computers, cellular telephones, etc.

The third class, externally generated EMI, includes <u>lightning</u> as well as man made <u>high intensity</u> radiated fields, HIRF, which is the focus of this study. HIRF incidents may result in <u>events</u> which have less severe consequences or those which are more severe and are called upsets.

Digital System upsets can be classified as shown in Table 1.1. Both Fig. 1.1 and Table 1.1 were developed at NASA Langley.

Much of the work on electromagnetic interference in aircraft has focused on lightning and the electromagnetic pulse generated by a nuclear explosion [Pitts, Spectrum 1988]. The work on HIRF has focused on computer models for fields within aircraft and measurement of fields within aircraft. Intuition would lead one to believe that the fuselage of an aircraft shields against HIRF. However, ample electromagnetic energy can enter the aircraft through windows, hull penetrations, and antennas. In fact, the fuselage can sometimes serve as a resonant cavity and thereby increase the HIRF fields. Furthermore, in the future the use of composite materials for aircraft will result in less shielding. Also the number of electronic and electrical systems used in aircraft design is increasing. There is even an MEA (More Electric Airplane) planning team composed of DOD, NASA, and industry representatives.

Typically, HIRF problems will occur when a modern aircraft with many Digital Systems flies too near a large powerful Radar, radio transmitter, or microwave beam. Fields are set up within the aircraft, they couple into the control electronics of the aircraft, and trigger warning lights, move control surfaces, disrupt communications, etc.

There are many reasons why HIRF data is difficult to come by. It is often hard to identify the cause of system upsets, aircraft manufactures and airlines are not too anxious to discuss HIRF problems because of liability and sometimes proprietary considerations, and events affecting military aircraft are often protected by military security. Furthermore, the cause of HIRF events may often be inadvertent effects on civilian aircraft of high powered military operations or covert drug interdiction – again events requiring secrecy. One source of information has been the Panel for Test and Analysis Methods of the Aircraft Radiated Environments Subcommittee (AE4R) of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). This committee was formed in the fall of 1987 in response to the FAA's desire to draft certification guidelines for protection of aircraft against the hazards of HIRF,

and has met 16 times.

As far as this author knows only one previous study similar to this research has been conducted. In 1980 Cockpit, the pilot association of west Germany published the results of a survey of "Phantom Symptoms in Complex Airborne Systems." The results showed that electronic computers in aircraft were subject to soft fails (presumably caused by Alpha-rays and cosmic rays) and that the rate increased with airplane generation (technology advances). [Taylor 1988]

Because of the problems in gathering such data, the approach taken in this study was an anonymous questionnaire distributed to experts and used to gather the necessary data. Such techniques are often called Delphi techniques (after the ancient Greek oracle) [Dalkey 1963] or Consensus Estimation [Shooman Jan., Feb., 1977]. This technique is discussed in more detail in Secs. 4 and 5. An advisory group of six knowledgeable people, (either experienced in the HIRF field or in consensus estimation), was formed to aid the author in compiling a list of experts who would be sent the form and to critique early drafts of the questionnaire. This group was extremely helpful in the conduct of the study. (See Sec. 5).

One of the objectives of this study was to be objective and have no preconceived bias, i.e. to neither believe that HIRF EMI is a rare and insignificant event nor that it is a frequent and dangerous occurrence. The objective was to develop as much information as possible on the frequency of occurrence and to let regulators, manufactures, and airlines draw their own informed conclusions.

2.0 RELATIONSHIP OF HIRF TO SAFETY

Many authorities feel that there is a need for special care as advanced technology is applied in aircraft avionics systems [Taylor 1988, Ch. 12]. Two important technologies, fly-by-wire control systems and digital avionics are being incorporated in an increasing number of modern designs. As more critical functions on advanced aircraft are automated the effect of EMI interference can be severe. Also, digital systems may be more sensitive to such interference and one can offer several hypotheses as to why this might be so:

1. A small pulse of noise in an analog system is added or mixed with the normal control signal and is generally a small effect because of the larger signal size. Quantitatively we speak of

the system signal/noise ratio. In the case of a digital signal if the noise pulse flips the least significant bit (0 to 1 or 1 to 0) this is a small effect in general. However, if the flipped bit is the most significant bit, a large error can occur.

- 2. If the noise tends to saturate (temporally disconnect) say the autopilot, the handing dynamics of the plane may change significantly. Commercial aircraft are dynamically stable [Anderson 1978, Blakelock, 1991], however this may not be the case in some modern high performance military or experimental aircraft such as the NASA X-29 aircraft, built by Grumman. This aircraft is dynamically unstable, and loss of the flight control computers (redundant for safety) leaves an aircraft which can not be controlled by the pilot.
- Some digital microelectronic devices are more sensitive to unwanted noise then older analog electronics.
- 4. Highly automated systems automatically correct for noise or unbalance. When such systems are switched off, large and disconcerting imbalances may plague the pilot as he assumes manual control. A good example of this effect is given in Lee [1991, p. 63] "A wide body jet on route from Taipei to Los Angeles experienced a loss in power of engine #4 (outermost right side). The captain failed to notice this problem since the autopilot was compensating. When the captain switched off the autopilot the plane swung violently to the right, tumbled out of control into a diving vertical roll and dropped from 41,000 to 11,000 feet over the Pacific Ocean in two minutes before the pilot regained control. Large chunks were ripped from the tail fins and landing gear and the wings were bent, however only two minor injuries occurred".

Sometimes the effects of various radio signals produce unexpected results. If an interference signal occurs at frequency f_1 and the system will only respond to signals near frequency f_2 , then we feel safe if these two frequencies are widely separated. However, there is the well known effect of intermodulation interference. Suppose a third frequency f_3 is present and signals f_1 and f_3 impinge on a nonlinearity in a device (say a multiplying effect). Then the well know trigometric identity tells us that $\cos(2\pi f_1 t) \propto \cos(2\pi f_3 t) = 0.5[\cos(2\pi (f_1 + f_3)t) + \cos(2\pi (f_1 - f_3)t)]$. Thus, if either the sum or difference frequencies are close to f_2 unsuspected interference effects can occur.

3.0 EVIDENCE OF HIRF

3.1 Introduction

As was discussed above, the nature of HIRF EMI is such that there have been virtually no studies of the frequency and nature of occurrence. Most of the work in this area has involved modeling, simulation, and measurement of the electromagnetic fields in the airspace nearby typical emitters, the penetration of aircraft fuselages by these fields, amplification of these fields due to resonances which occur within an aircraft, and the voltages and currents induced in typical wiring or electrical and electronic circuits by the interior fields.

Most of the evidence to date of HIRF EMI occurrence is anecdotal, (short stories or accounts about a happening, usually personal). Clearly a <u>large</u> collection of anecdotes begins to resemble a data base from which one can draw conclusions. Unfortunately, there are only a small number of such stories and I have attempted to list and document some of the incidents which have been brought to my attention in the following section.

3.2 A Collection of Anecdotes About HIRF

The term anecdote comes from the Greek word anekdota which is the plural of anekdotos, meaning unpublished. The term has come to mean a short entertaining account of some happening, usually personal or biographical. [Webster, 1959]. In this report we will assume that the teller of the anecdote is not an eye witness but an intelligent, professionally interested person who has talked to an eyewitness or heard about the happening. If the teller were an eyewitness we would attempt to have them fill out a questionnaire and to contribute to the data collected in Sec. 6.0. It is hoped that some of the readers of this report will contact this author in the future and supply more data on these incidents, contribute documented anecdotal information on other incidents, or help to put the author in touch with eyewitnesses to such incidents. These anecdotes are typical of those which have been reported. For identification purposes, these anecdotes are numbered sequentially in their order of occurrence.

Anecdote 1:

An airship (blimp) lost power while flying over a Voice of America transmitter at

Greenville, NC. The event happened sometime before April 23, 1990. The company service letter responding to this incident states [Skyships 1990]:

SERVICE LETTER

SUBJECT: ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE

During a recent operation in the state of North Carolina, USA, flying in close proximity to the "Voice of America" radio transmitter, [an airship] suffered an in-flight double engine failure. The flight crew followed the appropriate emergency procedures and after a period of "balloon" flight successfully executed an unpowered landing into a suitable landing area.

Preliminary investigations into the occurrence have indicated a failure of the ignition system due to extreme electromagnetic interference. It was noted that the units were Mod 1 status as opposed to Mod 2 status units. Mod 2 units have a design improvement to attenuate high frequency interference thereby giving a higher resistance to this type of electromagnetic interference.

In view of this, all pilots have been instructed to avoid flying within a five nautical mile radius of the "Voice of America" radio transmitter and all other high, intensity radio transmitter stations. It is strongly recommended that all operators issue the same instruction to their pilots. Operators should be aware that high intensity radio transmitters are not always marked on aviation charts and therefore should make their own research to identify all such transmitters in their operating area.

Mod 2 units are available The units will be supplied free of charge on an exchange basis.

In "successfully executing an unpowered landing", the pilot made an emergency landing but because of wind conditions was forced to use the emergency deflation "knife" which slices open the top of the envelope allowing all the 235,000 ft³ of helium to escape - a major expense. A hard landing resulted with some minor damage, however, no one was hurt and the emergency deflation procedure worked as designed. The failure was due to electronic circuitry failing, (burnout of microelectronic components?), and on Feb. 28, 1991 the FAA required that all ignition control units D, Mod 1 or Mod 2 be replaced with Mod 3 units. (FAA 1991).

Anecdote 2:

There have been many reports of suspected HIRF EMI experiences involving Caribbean flights. The official position of an affected commercial carrier is stated in a short 3 page paper presented at an SAE (The Engineering Society for Advancing Mobility Land Sea Air and Space) AE4R Committee (HIRF Committee) meeting [Wright, 1990]. Since 1984 the carrier has experienced unexplained simultaneous system faults of several aircraft systems, in the Caribbean area and

spreading to other areas, (around the Gulf of Mexico). The initial problems were with the Inertial Navigation System, INS, on wide body jet nonstop flights from London, arriving at dusk at Barbados, in the Caribbean Sea. The standard procedure was to power down the INS when arriving at the gate. On power up before departure, the INS would not countdown sufficiently for present position to be entered (on one or more of the three redundant units). One problem unit was returned to the manufacturer for investigation, and the memory was found to be scrambled but they could not explain why. Identical INS equipment on a supersonic airliner never reported faults. No critical systems have been affected. Flight crews sometimes replaced INS systems to cure the problem. Not all these incidents were reported since flight crews considered these nuisances. The problem has been temporarily fixed by leaving the INS running during turnarounds.

Other systems affected by unexplained faults include: pressurization outflow valves, anti-skid warning lights, window heat, cabin telephone system, air conditioning packs, heat valves. All these problems occur in the last 500 feet of final approach or on the ground, and all faults clear before or just after take-off, thus they are not considered a safety hazard.

The unofficial version of these incidents explained to this author by several knowledgeable sources sheds further light on the cause of these problems. There is a large amount of American shipboard and airborne surveillance in the Caribbean to intercept drug traffic. Most people feel that these high-power systems are responsible for most of these problems. Clearly the existence, operating schedule, frequencies, power levels, and other technical details must be kept secret and none of these are officially discussed.

Additional information is available in the notes for the CKC Labs HIRF Seminar [1991]. Effected locations are Barbados, Antigua, Bermuda, and Ascension Islands and several airlines and several types of wide body and narrow body jet aircraft have encountered these difficulties. The duration of the incidents is typically 10-15 minutes, can last up to 30-35 minutes, and one case lasted 4 hours.

Anecdote 3:

In 1983 a military fighter crashed in Germany. The crash occurred 1.8 miles from a Voice of

3.3 Evidence of HIRF in Established Data Bases

There are a number of data bases which have been established to collect potential or actual accident information involving aircraft. The best known is FAA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) run by NASA. [Reynard 1986] This system was established in 1975 by the FAA to serve as a confidential, nonpunititive incident reporting scheme "to encourage the reporting and identification of deficiencies and discrepancies in the system before they cause accidents or incidents." On April 15, 1976 the program was modified so that a third party, NASA would receive and analyze the reports. NASA continues to run the system with the assistance of a contractor who has for several years been Battelle. With the help and cooperation of Rowena Morrison of ASRS, who served as a member of the advisory board of this study, an ASRS Search was performed.

On July 17, 1991 I visited the ASRS offices in CA and with the help of Ms. Morrison and an ASRS researcher searched the data base for evidence of HIRF induced upsets. The initial choice of key words followed by an hour of experimentation was not very productive in locating any relevant records. On July 22, 1991 ASRS Researcher Stephanie Frank conducted Search Request No. 2236. [ARCS 1991] At the time the data base contained 33,193 full-form records received since Jan. 1, 1986 which were searched. (An additional 64,037 abbreviated-form records were not searched, since the keywords chosen were not identifiable in those records.) The first part of the search uncovered 147 reports which referenced avionics interference or subsystem problems in advanced cockpit aircraft. The second part of the search uncovered 42 reports referencing lightning strikes. Part one involved "aircraft equipment problems or loss of aircraft control by an aircraft with automated navigation equipment. Each report also contained one or more of the following key words: "antenna," "international operations," "passenger electronic devices," "military airspace," or "lightning," Clearly part 1 and 2 were not mutually exclusive and some reports were located in both searches, for example Accession Number 52386 appeared in both parts.

Accession Number 52386:

The report involves a wide body aircraft hit by a lightning strike just south of NYC. The report is by the Copilot. A portion of the one page report follows: "... we were given instructions to 'hold at sates' ... 'hold southwest of sates on the Deer Park 221 radial, left turns'... 'the Captain, disgruntled over the ambiguity of the holding instructions demanded to know the DME from Deer Park to SATES hold. I [Copilot] leaned over to my right to extract the New York (Northeast) low alt area chart from my flight bag when I heard 'PUUFF' like an air rifle shot and simultaneously winced at the white blinding flash of lightning. It took several seconds to blink away the flash while I resumed search for our specific holding pattern on the chart. At this time the Captain hollered 'what the hell happened to our altitude! Isn't anybody watching! Give me some help up here!' The autopilot had tripped off and as I glanced up from my chart the altimeter read 6600 ft., 400 ft. below our assigned altitude of 7000 ft." The Captain quickly recovered and reinstated the autopilot. [Subsequently both autopilots were used and both tripped off possibly due to gust loading and stabilizer out of trim condition, never-the-less they managed to remain within 200-300 feet of their assigned altitude.]

Other reports from part 1 are summarized below:

Accession Number 103733:

A wide body on approach to LaGuardia failed to receive normal clearance from ZDC. Captain attempted to contact ZDC with no avail. Finally they were able to contact another carrier and were eventually able to contact ZNY and Boston center who provided vectors into LaGuardia via #2 radio. On subsequent flight two days later the Captain and other carriers heard what were apparently citizens' band radio transmissions on ZDC frequency in the same area. ZDC said that citizens band interference had been occurring for the past two weeks and that the FCC was investigating.

Clearly one must understand some pilot "lingo" to fully understand the above accounts, however, the general details show several documented incidents of passenger equipment causing RFI, at least one incident of HIRF EMI (the CB radio), and several unexplained incidents. The lightning events were not studied further. The term callback is a name used by ASRS to describe selected reports

which are followed up by phone calls from ASRS members to obtain further details.

Many of the respondents suggested the study of other military and civilian data bases for evidence of HIRF EMI, however, such studies were beyond the scope of this grant.

4.0 EXPERT DATA COLLECTION

4.1 Introduction

The six members of the advisory committee made substantial contributions to the conduct of this study. Gerry Fuller of CKC Labs. has conducted many HIRF studies, consults in this area, and gives several HIRF seminars each year and is a member of the SAE AE4R committee. Rowena Morrison is a Research Coordinator on the Batelle staff of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System Office. Felix Pitts has guided electromagnetic compatibility research for many years at NASA Langley Research center and was the research monitor for this grant. Ronald Rogers is an airline Captain and engineer, is Chairman of the Airline Pilots Association's New Aircraft Evaluation and Certification Committee, and is Chairman of the Data Accuracy Panel of the SAE AE4R committee. Joe Fragola a Vice President of SAIC and Herbert Hecht, President of SoHar Inc., have many years of experience in aircraft safety and consensus estimation.

Consensus estimation only works if one has a set of knowledgeable experts. Thus recruiting a large sample of people who know little about HIRF is of little use. Inherently such a selection produces a biased sample. The group of 230 experts who were mailed questionnaires were chosen in three ways. The members of the SAE AE4R committee were all included (engineers, engineer/pilots, and pilots) and a number of additional names were suggested by the advisory committee for a total of 187. In addition, Captain Ronald Rogers from the Airline Pilots Association (a member of the advisory committee) and Bob Hall from the Airline Pilots Association Staff were very helpful in obtaining the names of 33 airline pilots who made up the remainder of the 230 experts, (57 of whom responded).

4.2 Choice of the Sample

It was felt that the group of SAE AE4R members were all biased in the direction of having

more familiarity with HIRF then an unbiased group of avionics experts or pilots. The group of 33 airline pilots were simply a group who agreed to help so they represented an unbiased sample.

The choice of bias was an advantage in that it improved the probability of receiving enough respondents who had seen HIRF EMI in such a small sample. However, it was a disadvantage in that the occurrence rates should be higher than those expected in an unbiased sample of airline pilots.

It was discussed in Sec. 3.2, that pilots in the Caribbean are likely to have seen HIRF EMI, however, it is unlikely that many of the pilots who responded had Caribbean flight experience.

During the course of this study it came to the authors attention the US military maintains an agreement with commercial airlines which allows them to "draft" commercial aircraft during a national emergency. Many pilots were "drafted" to fly in the Persian Gulf War. Donnegan & Bay [1992] cite the following information: Wide body jets were drafted in large numbers to assist in the movement of troops and equipment. Most of the troops were flown over, and most of them flew in wide bodies [op.cit. p. 209]. Three hundred wide bodies were used [op.cit. p.219]. The following quote from Schwartzkopf's Autobiography [1992, p. 341] verifies the use of commercial wide bodies: "By late August Saudi Arabia had absorbed more of our troops and military hardware than it had in its own armed forces, I went out to the air base at Dhahran, Near where I stood [a wide body had pulled up] and I watched soldiers from the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division stumbling out into the 130-degree heat".

Clearly there was a high probability that the "drafted" pilots observed HIRF EMI in the military theater of operations, however, none of them were included in this study.

5.0 DATA COLLECTION FORM

An initial draft of the data collection form was formulated by this author in July 1991 with major help and critiques by Gerry Fuller. After a number of drafts, the form was circulated to the entire advisory committee and other for review and critique. After several months and numerous written and oral changes and additions, the final form given in Appendix A was developed. Final typing, editing, and printing of the Questionnaire took place in the Spring of 1991 and the mailing began in the late Spring.

During the instruction with the questionnaire it was decided that rather than ask the respondents about just HIRF EMI, a broader class of RFI events would be included. This was done for two reasons. First it was felt that if only HIRF EMI events were included it was possible that respondents would include other sources of events which were not HIRF EMI. Secondly, it is sometimes easier to define something by saying what it is not, i.e. HIRF EMI is not interference caused by a passenger cellular telephone, HIRF EMI is not interference from the high frequency radio on a specific narrow body jet which is known to couple into the autopilot, HIRF EMI is not lightning effects, HIRF EMI is not effects due to equipment failures.

The data collection form was sent out to 187 participants between May 20, 1992 and May 22, 1992 and a subsequent group of 33 participants on June 30, 1992. After the second mailing approximately 10 names were suggested and mailings to these individuals were done the day received or the next. Thus, the total population contacted was 230. The survey forms were marked when received with a set of sequential numbers and the date received. Typically, the bunched forms were opened in batches a few days after receipt, except for travel periods when larger batches accumulated. If there were any uncertainty about the date received, it was estimated from the postmark. In an attempt to obtain additional returns, a second letter dated August 12, 1992 was sent to participants. (See Appendix A for a copy of this letter.)

6.0 COLLECTED DATA

6.1 Overall Features of Data Analysis

Between May 5 1992 and October 15, 1992, 57 responses were received, thus 25% of the

participants replied, a high ratio for a survey. (Typically, survey forms have a response rate of a few percent.) On Nov. 25, 1992 a 58th response was received, after the first 57 had been analyzed. It was sparsely filled out and did not add much additional data, thus it has not been included in the analysis. About a month later a 59th response was received which did include data on external EMI. Since the other data had already been tabulated, it was not included. The preliminary analysis of the responses is given in Table 6.1, which lists some major features of the responses. This data is primarily derived from Secs. 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, and 6.0 as indicated in the Table heading. A bar graph of the numbers returned in each two week interval is given in Fig. 6.1. (Note that response 1 on May 5 is grouped with the June 1 responses. This was the result of a mailing to a former astronaut of the next to the last iteration of the questionnaire. He not only sent suggestions, but filled out the questionnaire himself.) One of the goals of this study was to maintain a high degree of objectivity. Thus, this chapter is devoted to reporting and preliminary analysis of the data collected and interpretation is reserved for the following chapter.

After study of each data collection form, some interpretation was required in recording the data. It was clear that most respondents were intelligent, busy, interested and cooperative. To fill out this form in detail, answer every question, and recall experiences over many years of one's professional history can take several hours. Not all respondents spent that much time, and frequently there were comments in the margins in later pages indicating that earlier sections should be changed now that they better understood the form. (They probably didn't read it through before starting to fill it out.) In one case, a respondent went back with a red pen and corrected his responses. In other cases, I made such corrections once I understood the marginal comments. Interpretation played some role in recording the responses. Some obvious cases were interpreting never observed as zero incidents, 2-3 incidents as 2.5 incidents, and 1000's as 2,000. Other interpretations are commented on later as appropriate.

6.2 Respondents Experience Base (Aircraft Types)

In Sec. 1.0 the respondents delineated their professional expertise and types of aircraft with which they were familiar. This data was accumulated for the 57 responses and is given as totals on

a survey form. (See Appendix B.) In all about 144 professions were checked, thus most respondents were involved in about three professional areas over their careers, with engineers the most common (57) and pilots (29) the second most common. In addition, the respondents had experience with hundreds of different aircraft types.

In Sec. 2.2 and 2.3, Appendix B, the respondents characterized the types of aircraft affected by EMI incidents. Again a wide variety of aircraft were represented.

A goal of high importance was to obtain an estimate of frequency of occurrence of HIRF EMI events. Thus, emphasis is placed during analysis of the data on responses to questions concerning frequency of occurrence.

6.3 Number of Avionics EMI Events

In Sec. 2.0 the respondent was asked to report the number of EMI events which they were familiar with, and in Sec. 4.0 they were asked for more details on the nature of such events. The number of EMI results reported by category are listed in Table 6.2. In theory, the number of incidents reported in Sec. 2.1 should equal the sum of those reported in each category of Sec. 4.0. For example, for response 21, the 5 incidents reported were distributed as 1 external, 1 lighting, and 2 equipment failure. However, the number of incidents did not always equal the sum of those reported in each category.

To better understand how Sec. 4 was interpreted we examine two responses in detail. Respondent 20 reports 2-3 incidents but indicates 2 onboard, 1 lighting, and 3 equipment failure for a total of 6. More specifically, Sec. 4.1 was not checked and in Sec. 4.2 two checks appeared: VHF-UHF transmitter and computer. I judged that these were two separate Radio Frequency Interference, RFI, incidents rather than one which was caused by an interaction of VHF-UHF transmitter and the computer. No checks appeared in Sec. 4.3 and strike-airborne was checked in Sec. 4.4. In Sec. 4.5, intermittent transient, and hard failures were checked. I judged this to be 3 separate incidents rather than three manifestations of a single incident. No items were checked in Sec. 4.6. I feel that the explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that initially this respondent remembered 2-3 incidents, however, when asked more details in Sec. 4.0 more incidents were remembered, however, he did not

go back to Sec. 2.1 and increase his total. This interpretation is corroborated since in each case where asked "how sure of you of the source (affected system)", he answered certain (10).

In the case of respondent 19, he reported some details in Sec. 4.0 on 13 of the 1530 incidents he had data on. Clearly he did not observe 1530 incidents. He reports zero incidents in the first three categories of Sec. 2.1, and estimates approximately 30 incidents from conversations, approximately 500 from data reports, and approximately 1000 anecdotal accounts. I believe the 13 incidents discussed in Sec. 4.0 are those to be focused on. Similar interpretations were made for some of the other responses.

6.4 Consistency Check

In Sec. 4.7 the respondents were asked to estimate the percent of all EMI incidents which were due to passenger RFI, onboard RFI, etc. The results of this question appear in Table 6.3. One of the purposes of this question was to provide a consistency check on the number of events in each category reported in Table 6.2. In order to compare the number of events in Table 6.2 with the percentages in Table 6.3, the data in Table 6.2 was converted into percentages in Table 6.4. For example respondent 1 reported zero passenger events in Table 6.2 and one in each of the other 5 categories. Thus, in Table 6.4, 0% were passenger incidents, and 20% were associated with each of the other categories. Because of roundoff, not all the percentages in Table 6.4 add to exactly 100%. A comparison of Tables 6.3 and 6.4 shows that 21 respondents answered the questionnaire completely enough so that the percentages in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 could be compared. The two sets of data are compared in Table 6.5.

Several methods are available for comparing the relationship between two such sets of data. Suppose we wish to check the two sets of data for consistency. In the ideal case, we assume that the respondents wrote down their observations on scrap paper and answered sections 4.0 and 4.7 by referring to that set of data. In such a case, we would expect the responses to be the same and would see identical entries in Table 6.5, indicating a linear relationship between the two sets of data. A simple test for such a linear relationship is to plot the two sets of data on a Cartesian coordinate system and examine the resulting graph. Such graphs are plotted in Fig. 6.2 for two respondents, #1

and #14. The data in Fig. 6.2 seems to approximately fit a horizontal straight line through y=20. This indicates that the y values do not increase with x but stay constant. In Fig. 6.2b we see quite a different situation where a straight line connecting the points (0,0) and (40,40) seems to fit the data well. In statistical terminology, we would say that x and y were poorly correlated in Fig. 6.2a and well (highly) correlated in Fig. 6.2b. In fact, a more objective procedure is to calculate the coefficient of correlation r which is defined in Appendix C. A correlation of r=+1 indicates a perfect linear relationship, all the points fall on a line through the origin with a slope of 45°. A correlation of r=-1 indicates a perfect linear relationship along a line through the origin with a slope of 135°. No correlation, r=0, represents a horizontal straight line. The values of r are given in the last column of Table 6.5 and were calculated using a simple PC computer program, written in BASIC, which implemented the formulas in Appendix C.

We wish to establish an objective procedure for deciding when r is large enough so that we can classify individual responses as consistent or possibly inconsistent. In Appendix C, we compare the hypothesis that the responses are uncorrelated (r is actually 0) and by chance the data exhibited some correlation with the hypothesis that a result 0<r<1 truly represents correlation. If we use a probability of 0.1 that correlation was by chance, then chance correlation is rejected as long as 0.6 <r< 1.0. Examining Table 6.5 we see that 13 responses qualify according to this criteria: #8, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23, 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 55, 56.

The data in Table 6.5 was compared in another way. The values for external EMI (the HIRF data we seek) were analyzed by studying the correlation of the estimated and calculated values, for the 13 data sets where r>0.61 and for all the 21 data sets. The results are given in Table 6.6.

6.5 EMI Occurrence Frequencies

The consistency analysis of the previous section dealt with percentages of the various EMI events. We now discuss the occurrence rates of the various EMI events. We begin by analyzing in greater detail the data collected in Sec. 2.1. The first observation is that the pilots or pilot/engineers are in general reporting events which they have experienced or which have been reported to them, whereas the EMI Specialists and Engineers are reporting on data in a data base collected by their

company, government organization, etc. Thus, we split the data into two groups for presentation and later analysis. Table 6.7 lists observational intervals (years, flights) and number of incidents of all EMI incidents as reported by pilots. The data is sparse and only the observations as a pilot seem worthy of further study. The total number of EMI incidents observed by pilots from Table 6.7, along with the calculated EMI incidents/year, EMI incidents/flight, means and standard deviations are given in Table 6.8. Examination of response number 27 reveals a relatively small number of flights, a large number of observed events, and a large frequency per flight. Applying a statistical test for outliers as described in Appendix C.3 verifies that it is wise to reject this datum, concluding it is from a different population than the other 11. Inspection of the recalculated moments, (see footnote to Table 6.8), shows that the new mean is about half the previous value and the new variance is about 1/3 as large; another validation of the advantages of dropping this one point from the other 11. If we examine the frequency per year reported by respondent number 23, we see that the value of 5 also looks a little high, and statistical analysis shows that this datum as well as the value 2 should be rejected. We conclude that these two points are from a different population than the other 14, and the means and variances decrease.

The observational intervals (years, flights) and number of incidents of HIRF EMI incidents (external EMI) observed by pilots are calculated per pilot year and per flight are calculated as are the means and standard deviations. The number of events is from column 8 of Table 6.2 and the pilot years and pilot flights from Table 6.8.

The frequency of all EMI incidents for the EMI Specialist/Engineer respondents is given in Table 6.10. The data is fragmentary for observation as a pilot or crew member, as it should be. EMI specialists and engineers can be private pilots and occasional crew members (for example on test flights), however, these are infrequent roles for this group. One could even argue that the pilot observations of respondent 19 and 33 should be grouped along with the pilot responses in Table 6.7, however, this was not done since 10 and 33 contribute little data. In the cases of conversations, reports, and anecdotes there is considerable data, however, it is unclear how to calculate rates. In all likelihood, this is from a data base constructed by adding many individual observations of incidents. Although the number of incidents should be trustworthy, it is not clear whether the years of

observation and the total number of flights are as clearly defined as in the case of pilots. However, the passenger observations in Table 6.10 (and those of pilots who are passengers in Table 6.7) represent a known population and can be used to calculate occurrence frequencies. This data appears in Table 6.11. A similar table is constructed for HIRF events from the event reports in Sec. 4.3 and the interval data in Table 6.10 (see Table 6.12). In the case of HIRF, it is likely that the events in Sec. 4.3 reported by engineers were not personal observations but study of reports. In fact it is possible that more than one person is reporting on the same event.

During the study of data from Tables 6.7 and 6.10 for constructing Tables 6.11 and 6.12, I observed that many respondents left blank the section on observations of EMI incidents as a passenger. Also a few listed 0 observations. I judged the blank responses as "no opportunity to observe" and did not count them. On the other hand, a response of 0 was judged to mean: "I would have recognized upset incidents as a passenger, I didn't observe any, thus the number is zero", and these were counted. In studying the responses in Sec. 4.3, both blank responses and 0's will be counted as 0 in Table 6.12. Clearly some of these flights must have been test flights with engineers sitting with the crew, passenger pilots sitting with or talking to flight captains or crew, or "regular" pilot-passengers or engineer-passengers on regular commercial flights. No attempt was made to differentiate between these different types of observations, in this section or other sections of the questionnaire.

One can recalculate the upset data in Tables 6.8 and 6.11 for only the most consistent observers, i.e. those with $r \ge 0.6$ in Tables 6.5. The sample sizes become much smaller and the results are given in Tables 6.13 and 6.14.

6.6 Anatomy of EMI Events

In addition to the statistics presented above, there is much information of a qualitative nature which was contained in the survey. Some of this material is contained in the comments which were given in Sec. 6.0 of the questionnaire. These reports have been reproduced verbatim in Appendix D and report a wide variety of different events. There is also additional information to be gained by studying the overall picture given by the 6 pilots who reported observing HIRF (c.f. Table 6.9). A

brief composite of these reports is given below:

#1 Pilot:

This military and commercial pilot who also was an astronaut and had engineering training has over 20 years of experience and has flown many different aircraft including business jets, single engine turboprop, military fighter, bomber, fighter/bomber, and tankers, and the Space Shuttle. He witnessed 5 EMI incidents as a pilot involving military fighter, bomber, fighter/bomber, and the Space Shuttle. The upsets occurred with avionics in good condition during ascent, descent, and earth orbit in clear or clouds or rain reducing visibility. Incidents of onboard RFI were caused by the VHF-UHF transmitter, radar, intercom, and navigation equipment affecting the communications and navigation equipment, and instrumentation. External RFI, HIRF, was caused by military radar, air traffic control radar, and shipboard radar transmitters which affected communication and navigation equipment as did the lightning incidents when they were observed. Also transient equipment failures and unknown failures affect the communications and navigation system. The certainty of these upsets was rated between 7 and 10. The criticality of the onboard RFI was rated as 3, the External RFI 5, those due to lightning as 6, and the equipment failure and unknown as critically 2. Additional comments appear in Appendix D.

#11 Pilot:

This corporate pilot who also has engineering training has over 20 years of experience and has flown many different aircraft including narrow body, business jets, heavy twin turboprop, light twin turboprop, single engine turboprop, and helicopters. He witnessed 5 EMI incidents as a pilot and 3 as a crew member, learned of 3 from study of reports, and others from contact with certification projects. The types of aircraft affected were business jets, single engine turboprops and piston. The EMI incidents occurred with avionics in good condition (or a design problem with a particular subsystem), during straight and level flight, descent, low-level flight, and low traffic in both clear and medium visibility. Incidents of onboard RFI caused by the high frequency transmitter affected the autopilot causing pitch oscillations. External RFI, HIRF, was caused by commercial AM or short wave transmitters which affected the

autopilot and engine controls. Lightning (strike-indirect) affected the autopilot, navigation equipment, and instrumentation. Transient and electrostatic discharge equipment failures, affected navigation equipment and instrumentation. Unknown sources affected the autopilot and engine controls. The certainty of these events was rated as 10 except for lightning (6) and equipment failures 8. He rated the EMI reported of criticality 5 or 6. Additional comments appear in Appendix D.

#15 Pilot/Engineer:

This military and nonscheduled pilot and engineer with over 30 years of experience has flown many different aircraft and studied reports on upsets. The aircraft affected by HIRF included: wide body and narrow body jets, helicopters, airships, business jets, and a military fighter. He witnessed 8 incidents of EMI as a pilot and has learned of many other incidents from conversations, reports, and anecdotal accounts. The weather conditions and equipment condition were not significant, and incidents occurred during landing, takeoff, straight and level flight, taxiing, and while parked. An incident of passenger RFI due to a portable tape player affected navigation ILS and VOR receivers and the diagnosis was certain (10). Onboard RFI incidents included the instrument panel lightning circuit which affected the magnetic compass, and the high frequency transmitter affecting the autopilot on a narrowbody jet. External RFI, HIRF, included countermeasures equipment on military airplanes affecting various systems on commercial aircraft in the vicinity, Voice of America Transmitter, land and shipboard military radar, ECM and jammer equipment effecting communications equipment, helicopter flight controls, panel lights, and automated landing gear brake. Lightning was observed to affect accidental firing of sounding rockets, disrupt navigation equipment, and produced an ear splitting noise in a communications headset. Equipment failure was transient and affected communications and navigation equipment. The diagnosis of the causes and effects of all the above EMI was listed as certain (10). The criticality of the various EMI was rated at various levels; passenger RFI 4, Onboard RFI 3, External RFI 5 or 10 lightning 2, and equipment failure varying with the technology level of the effected systems. Additional comments appear in Appendix D.

#21 Pilot/Manager:

This former military pilot and manager with over 20 years of experience has flown single engine piston, military trainers, helicopters, and turboprop transports. He has witnessed about 5 incidents of EMI as a pilot, and the aircraft affected was a turboprop transport. The EMI occurred on aircraft with avionics in good condition during flight maneuvers in clouds or rain. The EMI was listed as external RFI or equipment failure and was analyzed as such by this author, however upon checking all the forms this one form was found that respondent #21 listed under External RFI incidents which caused communications equipment and instrumentation disturbances, and these may have been caused by lightning. Thus, response 21 could be reanalyzed, shifting some upsets from external EMI to lightning. If this were to be done the data for forms 58 and 59 would be included, and the net results would change only slightly. (See Sec. 8.0.) EMI due to equipment failure was listed as causing transient failures of communications equipment, instrumentation, and radar. Respondent #21 rated EMI caused by lightning and equipment failure of severity 2. Additional comments appear in Appendix D.

#23 Pilot/Engineer:

This commercial and corporate pilot and engineer with over 30 years of experience has flown several different aircraft including business jets, light twin turboprop, and single engine turboprop. He has witnessed about 100 incidents of EMI as a pilot, and the aircraft affected were turboprop aircraft. The EMI events occurred on aircraft with avionics in good condition during straight and level flight, ascent and descent, and weather conditions were deemed not significant. The onboard computer, radar, EFIS, FMS, and Flight Director Systems affected communications and navigation systems. Diagnosis of source was certain (10), because "on the ground we pulled circuit breakers until the interference stopped" and the system affected was certain (10) since "interference can be clearly heard on the VHF COM, VOR, and ADF receivers and deviations in the VOR and ADF Navigation data are also clearly evident". HIRF effects caused by a commercial FM transmitter affected communications and navigation equipment and the identification was certain (10) since the FM voice transmissions could be

clearly heard in the VHF COM and the VOR/LOC receiver. An airborne lightning strike burned out the diodes in the engine driven alternator, the output went to zero and the faulty diodes were found during ground maintenance. Respondent #23 rated EMI caused by onboard and external RFI of severity 4 and the others of severity 5. Additional comments appear in Appendix D.

#40 Pilot:

This military and commercial pilot with over 30 years of experience (since 1941) has flown many different aircraft including wide body, narrow body, regional jets, heavy twin turboprop, and military fighters. He witnessed several incidents of EMI as a pilot and crew member and learned of one other by conversation and one by reading a report. The types of aircraft affected were narrow body and regional jets. The upsets occurred on aircraft with avionics in good condition during landing, straight and level flight, and descent in both clear and cloudy or rainy weather. One event involved what was thought to be unknown origin which affected the autopilot and navigation equipment. An incident of onboard RFI caused by navigation equipment affected the autopilot, spoilers, and navigation equipment. Both these events were later diagnosed on the ground. Two other events were determined with certainty when they occurred and involved a hand held walkie-talkie [HIRF] and lightning. He rated upsets caused by lightning and equipment failure of concern (criticality 4), however, he reports that he heard of a narrow body which "banked sharply and dropped 20,000 [ft.]" - [which certainly sounds like a more serious situation.] Additional comments appear in Appendix D. [Unfortunately further details on the walkie-talkie, HIRF-incident were not given].

6.7 Attributes Associated with HIRF

A large number of the questions answered by the respondents dealt with various qualitative attributes and details of their experience. For example, in question 1.1, most of the respondents had

many years of experience which encompassed a number of different roles, thus out of the 57 respondents, there were 29 checks for some type of pilot experience and 57 checks for some type of engineer, physicist, or mathematician experience. Thus, the survey covered a wide variety of experience. A summary of the responses to question 1.1 appears in Appendix B.

Question 1.3 dealt with the types of aircraft with which the respondents were familiar. They covered a wide range of commercial and military aircraft. In the case of commercial aircraft 28 types were checked plus an airship, 5 types of helicopters, and 15 others were specified. Although the more popular types of aircraft were better represented, there was no predominant type. Similar results were found for business jet, turbo prop, and military/government types. In questions 2.2 an 2.3 the respondents discussed the types of aircraft affected by the various EMI incidents they were reporting on. Again popular types were more prevalent, but there was no predominant type. Detailed Summaries appear in Appendix B.

In questions 3.1 and 3.2 the respondents were asked under what conditions EMI occurs. A wide variety of flight conditions and weather conditions were reported and no consensus seemed to appear. Question 3.3 dealt with level of maintenance and most of the respondents checked either good condition [17] or design problems with a particular subsystem [9].

In section 4, the types of RFI sources and systems affected were treated and the surety of the source and affected systems were probed. In summary the results showed:

- For Passenger RFI: Sources were difficult to determine [5.3] and affected a number of different equipments, however the affected systems were easier to determine [7.6].
- For Onboard RFI: The most common sources were radio transmitters and all sources were relatively easy to determine [8.8] as were the systems affected [8.8] which were most commonly communications or navigation equipment.
- For External RFI: The most common sources were various types of radar equipment [15 reported] and various types of radio transmitters [12 reported]. All sources were relatively easy to determine [8.9] as were the systems affected [9.0] which included several types of systems.
- For Lightning: An airborne strike was most common and it was easy to determine the source [9.2] and the system affected [9.1]. The affected system was most commonly communications or navigation equipment.

- For Equipment Failure: Transient failures were most common, the source was fairly easy to determine [7.8], as was the various systems affected [7.9].
- For Unknown Sources: Only affected systems could be determined and the surety level was high [8.8]. Several different systems were affected.

Because of the small sample size and the fairly even distribution of the various sources and systems affected (except as specified above), numerical computations of the various frequencies were not attempted. The reader is referred to Appendix B for further details.

7.0 INTERPRETATION OF DATA

7.1 Introduction

This report is based on a data gathering effort which is somewhere between a survey and the creation of a data base. In the case of a survey, one would expect mainly qualitative information and much interpretation of the responses would be required. On the other hand, creation of a data base involves the collection of quantitative data and statistical interpretation. Since EMI in general and HIRF in particular is not easy to define, much of the construction of the questionnaire and its interpretation involved reading the responses in entirety and getting the sense of the respondent before using the data. In general, the respondents seemed to be a highly qualified, intelligent, and interested group and the response rate of over 25% (quite high for surveys in general) testified to these facts. However, by and large they seemed to be busy people and did not have time to study or ponder over the questions. This was evidenced by the fact that in some cases they went back over the form and corrected responses or left marginal notes regarding corrections of their responses once the import of particular questions became clearer. Several such cases where interpretation was required were discussed in Sec. 6. Statistical tests for outliers were applied to the approximately 10 samples in Table 6.8 and a few were found to be outliers, however, the means and standard deviations were reported both with and without the outliers. No attempt was made to apply such techniques to the approximately 5 samples of Table 6.9 and 6.11 or the two samples of Table 6.12. Common sense tells us that with such small populations all the data points are needed, and rejection of outliers in very small populations may be questioned regardless of the results of such statistical hypothesis testing. Thus, the interpretations in the remainder of this section will contain both qualitative and quantitative aspects.

7.2 Consistency of Data

The use of consensus estimation and expert opinion, relies on the recollections of a group of experienced experts. In some cases, the experts actually have data and reports on which to base their estimates, but because of proprietary, secrecy, privacy, or other such reasons, they can not quote the data but can provide their professional estimate (based on the data). During analysis of the 57 responses, it seemed clear that only a few of the respondents were replying based on an established data base, and that most of them were trying to recollect as best as possible actual situations they had witnessed. Anticipating that such would be the case, some questions were asked from two different viewpoints, so that subsequent analysis of the similarity of the responses could be used as a rough gauge of the consistency of the respondents recollections. The correlation coefficients of 13 of the 21 respondents in Table 6.5 (62%) had a high enough correlation > 0.6 to reject the hypothesis that they were uncorrelated. Furthermore, in Table 6.6 the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the data showed quite reasonable agreement. Thus, in general the data collected seem to be internally consistent, especially for the smaller set of 13 respondents.

7.3 Occurrence Rates - Point Estimates

A major focus of this study was to determine the occurrence rate of avionics EMI caused by HIRF. Also to help differentiate HIRF from other EMI, data was taken on several EMI sources which affect avionics operation. The occurrence rates listed in Tables 6.8 - 6.14 are reported as point estimates, (mean value used as the point estimate), in Table 7.1.

Studying Table 7.1 we see that the frequency per year of all EMI upsets observed by pilots varies between 0.25 and 1.56 depending on how we treat the data statistically. This is a range of about 6:1 and much of this variation is probably due to the small sample size. The frequency per 1000 flights varies from 2.60 to 7.93, a range of only about 3:1 which would lead one to believe that some of the large range of occurrences per year is due to fairly wide variations in the number of flights

reported per year. An examination of Table 6.8 shows a mean number of flights equal to 2,691 and a standard deviation of 2,068 which reinforces the above conjecture that the number of flights per year varies considerably.

The number of all EMI events observed by passengers varies over a smaller range than that of pilots. Also we see that the number of observations per year is less for passengers than pilots, (probably because they are on fewer flights), however, The number of EMI upsets per flight varies less between pilot and passenger groups.

When we observe the HIRF occurrence frequencies in Table 7.1 we find that for pilots HIRF occurrences represent about 3.6% of all EMI events incidents per year and about 1% of the EMI incidents per flight. In the case of passengers, HIRF incidents represent about 80%, (seems unlikely that this should be so high), of all EMI occurrences per year, and about 8.4% of the incidents per flight.

The number of avionics systems which are potentially sensitive to HIRF has been increasing rapidly in recent years. Thus, the values of occurrences/flights or occurrences/year may have been increasing in recent years. The values reported in the questionnaire do not indicate the years in which the EMI incident occurred, thus only averages over the respondents experience period can be computed. Thus, the data can not be analyzed to see if occurrence rates incease with calendar years.

7.4 Occurrence Rates - Interval Estimates

Because of the wide dispersion of the data it may be more appropriate to deal with interval estimates. Interval estimates for the occurrence rate data can be computed using the statistical techniques described in Appendix C. These are computed for the most significant data, the frequency of HIRF occurrences per flight and are given in Table 7.2.

7.5 Criticality of EMI Events

In evaluating the effect of HIRF and other disturbances, it is important to study the severity of these incidents. The results of Section 5 of the study are given in Appendix B. In general, there was a significant variation in the level of concern among the respondents, as evidenced by the fairly large standard deviations in each case. Passenger RFI, Onboard RFI and Unknown Source RFI showed a critically level which averaged "Concern". In the case of Onboard Systems RFI, HIRF, and

Lightning, the average (5.7 with a standard deviation of 3.0) was closer to "Emergency Procedures".

We can learn more about HIRF criticality if we study the five pilots who reported HIRF incidents (#1,11,15,23,40) in Table 6.9. These five pilots reported HIRF criticalities of 5, 5, 5(10), 5, left blank. Respondent 40, did not list any affected systems or criticality level for HIRF. However, he reported that the external RFI he witnessed was due to a hand-held (walkie-talkie) transmitter which affected outflow values. Perhaps this was an incident which occurred when parked or taxiing and thus was not of real concern since the aircraft was not in flight. Respondent 15 listed a 10 for "Tornado due to VOA", obviously the Tornado incident discussed in Sec. 3.2. Furthermore he commented on his criticality rating of 5: " brakes, pressurization, etc., British Airways learned to live with it." Clearly this referred to the British Airways experiences discussed in Sec. 3.2. In summary, respondents (#1,11,15,23,40) were remarkably consistent in their rating of criticality, 5, which agreed well with the mean of 5.7 for all the respondents.

7.6 Comparison of HIRF Occurrence Rates with Other Occurrence Rates

As stated in the introduction this report takes a neutral attitude toward the significance and importance of HIRF. Such decisions are for policy makers. However, in interpreting the results of this study it is important to compare the results with a few other events related to transportation safety. In our comparisons we will relate the results of this study and others we use for comparison purposes to two rate metrics, frequency/flight (or frequency /trip) and frequency per hour, where one or both of these metrics is available. The results of this study and the comparative rates are given in Table 7.3. In Table 7.3 the RFI results of this study are compared with fatality rates for various modes of transportation and other events. These rates were chosen because they are transportation related, and are available. We must remember that RFI does not in general cause fatalities, (remember the criticality ratings of Sec. 7.5), thus the RFI values should be multiplied by the percentage of RFI event which result in fatalities for direct comparison. Unfortunately this value is not available. An alternative would be to compare the RFI values with other similar events such as aircraft collision near misses, automobile severe skids or steering and braking system failures. Again these values are not readily available. The reader should be reminded that this was a biased sample (c.f. Sec. 4.2).

Comparing the events of Table 7.3 we see that the number of RFI events per hour varies between 10^{-3} and 10^{-4} per hour, and the number of HIRF EMI events per hour varies between 10^{-4} and 10^{-5} per hour. Depending on which values we compare, the HIRF EMI rates vary from roughly equal to all RFI values to about 1/65 of the RFI total. For comparison the fatality rates per hour for other modes of transportation, (and also disease), range from 10^{-6} to 10^{-7} (except for general aviation which is 10^{-5}). Thus, HIRF EMI events occur about 100 times as frequently as transportation fatalities. Comparison of the frequencies per hour with the frequencies per trip shows that the rates per trip are 3-30 times greater than those per hour, and much of this is due to average trip length in hours.

8.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The technique of consensus estimation, the use of an anonymous questionnaire to solicit the opinion and estimates of experts, has been used to develop data on HIRF EMI. Although HIRF EMI is an uncommon event, difficult to define, and sometimes shrouded in secrecy for various reasons, the methodology has worked and revealed basic information about HIRF EMI. Out of the sample of 57 respondents, 5 clearly experienced some form of HIRF EMI (the pilots), and two observed it as passengers (the engineers). Though the sample is small, the descriptions of the HIRF EMI events are clear, and along with the anecdotal evidence cited we can conclude that HIRF EMI does occur. The significance, risk, importance, means of reduction, and other related matters are the purview of policy makers.

Much can be done to continue the study of HIRF EMI:

- The computations can be repeated to correct for the effects of respondents 21, 57, and 58.
- A bigger sample can be questioned to increase the number of respondents who have experienced HIRF EMI.
- One can focus future studies on "high risk" HIRF EMI groups, such as Caribbean Pilots,
 Drafted Desert Storm Commercial Pilots, and military pilots.
- Contact can be made with pilots in other countries who may have HIRF EMI experience.
- Relate, through the creation of a larger data base (as suggested above) or via a focused study, the frequency and consequences of HIRF EMI as a function of the amount of digital

automation in various aircraft.

- Study the potential for and mechanisms of HIRF EMI induced safety problems such as those discussed in Sec. 2.
- The various trade-offs involved in shielding fly-by-wire systems compared with using fly-by-light systems to reduce avionics upsets can be studied [Baker and Pitts, 1992].

TERMINOLOGY






Fig. 1.1 Electromagnetic Interference Terminology




QuestionnaireSecondReminderMailedMailingLetterFirst Groupto PilotsAug. 12May 20-22June 30

Fig. 6.1 Return rate of the questionnaires.



a) Response #1; r=0.40.



b) Response #14; r=0.92.

Legend:

Fig. 6.2. Comparison of Two Sets of Data from Table 6.5.

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Digital System Upset TABLE 1.1

Functional Error Mode

- System/Subsystem Level Caused by Electrical Transient Lightning
- HH
- No Component Damage

Requires Corrective Action

- Reset/Reload Software
- Internal Recovery Mechanism (Hardware/Software)

<u> </u>		_										-							-	-					-		•						$\overline{}$
	Comments	**************************************	Asuonaur	No opportunity	No Knowledge	;	ŀ	-	1	Don't Remember	**	!	1	-	ŀ	;	Also Government	:	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	!	1	ì	;	;	
.2, 2.1, 6.0)	Event Description	V/ = -	res	ON.	S _o	N _o	N _o	Yes	N _o	N _o	S _o	Š	Yes	o Z	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	o N	o N	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	S S	Š.	Yes	ž	Š	Yes	
(Sections 1.1, 1	Number of Incidents	L.	Λ ⁽	-	1	102	0	4	5	12.5	0	0	11		က	32	28.+	10		13	1530	2.5	5	ů.	100	8	0	0	24	0	2	30	
TABLE 6.1 Preliminary Analysis of Completed Questionnaire (Sections 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 6.0)	Degree of Completion		Detailed	Medium	IZ.	Detailed	Some	Detailed	Medium	Detailed	Medium	Some	Detailed	Some	Detailed	Detailed	Detailed	Detailed	Detailed	Detailed	Detailed	Detailed	Detailed	Detailed	Detailed	Detailed	Some	Some	Some	Some	Medium	Detailed	
lysis of Comple	Experience > Years		702	10	30	5	20	10	30	30	10	30	20	30	30	38	30	20	30	30	30	20	20	30	30	10	10	20	10	20	30	20	
Preliminary Ana	Work		Pilot	EMI Specialist	Manager/Engr.	EMI Specialist	Engineer	EMI Specialist	EMI Specialist	EMI/Pilot	Psy/Manager	EMI Specialist	Pilot/Engineer	Engineer	EMI Specialist	EMI Specialist	Pilot/Engineer	EMI Specialist	EMI Specialist	EMI Specialist	Engineer	Engineer/Mgr.	Pilot/Manager	EMI Specialist	Pilot/Engineer	Pilot/Engineer	Pilot	Pilot/Engineer	Pilot/Engineer	EMI Specialist	Manager	EMI Specialist	
	Date Received		May 05	Jun 01	Jun 02	Jun 04	Jun 08	Jun 08	Jun 08	Jun 08	Jun 08	Jun 08	Jun 08	Jun 08	Jun 08	Jun 10	Jun 15	Jun 15	Jun 15	Jun 15	Jun 15	Jun 15			Jun 19	Jun 19	Jun 22						
	Response Number			2	3	4	2	9	7	∞	6	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	78	29	30	

	Unknown	101001100070000000000000000000000000000
	Equipment Failure	10001700003351017000001000001
	Lighting	1000017110100001
1, 4.0)	External	10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sections 2.	Onboard	1 102 0 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Category (Sections 2.1,	Pass	000000000000000000000000000000000000000
TABLE 6.2 Reported by	Number of Incidents	102 102 4 4 5 12.5 0 111 13 1530 160 17 1830 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 19
of EMI Events	Degree of Completion	Detailed Medium Nil Detailed Some Detailed Medium Detailed
Number	Experience > Years	20 20 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
	Work	Pilot Manager/Engr. EMI Specialist Engineer EMI Specialist EMI Specialist EMI Specialist EMI Specialist EMI Specialist Pilot/Engineer EMI Specialist Pilot/Engineer EMI Specialist Pilot/Engineer Pilot/Engineer Pilot/Engineer Pilot/Engineer Pilot/Engineer Pilot/Engineer Pilot/Engineer Pilot/Engineer EMI Specialist Manager EMI Specialist
	Response Number	1 2 5 4 5 9 7 8 6 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

		Number	of EMI Eve		tinued) Category (tinued) Category (Sections 2.1,	.1, 4.0)			
Response Number	Work	Experience > Years	Degree of Completion	Number of Incidents	Pass	Onboard	Ехтегла	Lighting	Equipment Failure	Unknown
32	EMI Specialist	20	Detailed	10	0	4	3	3	3	3
33	EMI Specialist	20	Medium	0,(15)	0	10	7	+ -1	7	Н
34	EMI Specialist	30	Detailed	5	₩	2	0	S	Many	0
35	Pilot/Engineer	30	Detailed	14	0	0			,	0
36	Pilot	30	Some	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
37	Pilot	20	Some	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
38	Pilot	30	Medium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
33	Pilot	30	Detailed	1,(1)	0	-	0	0	0	0
40	Pilot	30	Medium	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
41	Pilot	30	Medium	∞	-	2	-	7	0	+
42	1	1	ł	1	;	;	1	ł	1	1
43	EMI Specialist	20	Some	-	0	0	0	0	0	0
44	Engineer/Mgr.	30	Some	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
45	Pilot	30	Some	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
46	Gov't. Admin.	30	Some	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
47	Engineer	1	1	ŀ	ı	1	;	ł	1	1
48	Engineer/Mgr.	10	Some	0,(14)			4	1	-1	9
49	EMI/Manager	20	Some	S	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	EMI/Engineer	30	Medium	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
51	EMI Specialist	10	Medium	7	0	0	0	0	0	ó
52	Gov't. Admin.	5	Detailed	∞	_	7			П	П
53	Engineer	20	Some	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
54	EMI/Manager	20	Some	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
55	EMI Specialist	•	Detailed	63	0	7		2	0	0
99	Pilot	10	Detailed	2	0(3)	0	0		-	2
57	EMI Specialist	70	Detailed	Many	` `0	7	4	4	2	0
	EMI Specialist	10	Medium	Several	0	7	-		0	0
				••						
							-			·

		Estimated	TABLE 6.3 Cause of EMI Events - Percentages (Section 4.7)	TABLE 6.3 II Events - Per	centages (\$	ection 4.7	(,		
Response Number	Work	Experience > Years	Degree of Completion	Pass	Onboard	External	Lighting	Equipment Failure	Unknown
1	Pilot	20	Detailed	0	25	25	50	0	0
2	EMI Specialist	10	Medium	,	•	ı	ı	,	1
8	Manager/Engr.	30	ïZ	ı	1	1	,	ı	r
4	EMI Specialist	5	Detailed	ī	,	٠	ı	ı	ı
S	Engineer	20	Some	•	ı	1	,	,	ı
9	EMI Specialist	10	Detailed	1	ĭ	ı	,	ī	1
! ~	EMI Specialist	30	Medium	1	ı	•	1	,	,
∞	EMI/Pilot	30	Detailed	S	75	2	S	5	51
6	Psy/Manager	10	Medium	ı	ı	•	ı	ı	ı
10	EMI Specialist	30	Some	ı		1	1	•	ı
11	Pilot/Engineer	20	Detailed	0	20	35	35	0	10
12	Engineer	30	Some	1	ı	•	ı	ı	ı
13	EMI Specialist	30	Detailed	•	ı	ī	'	,	,
14	EMI Specialist	38	Detailed	0	40	40	10	10	0
15	Pilot/Engineer	30	Detailed	S	ς.	20	40	0	0
16	EMI Specialist	20	Detailed	0	22	23	25	25	0
17	EMI Specialist	30	Detailed	0	0	0	0	0	100
18	EMI Specialist	30	Detailed	0	100	0	0	0	0
19	Engineer	30	Detailed	0		0	₩	88	12
20	Engineer/Mgr.	20	Detailed	1	8	1	•	1	,
21	Pilot/Manager	20	Detailed	0	0	25	75	0	0
22	EMI Specialist	30	Detailed	2.5	20	2.5	10	65	ල
23	Pilot/Engineer	30	Detailed	0	66	0	-	0	0
24	Pilot/Engineer	10	Detailed	1	•	ı	,	•	•
25	Pilot	10	Some	ı	ı	ı	1	•	ı
26	Pilot/Engineer	20	Some	•	1	,	1	1	ı
27	Pilot/Engineer	10	Some	0	20	0	0	65	104
28	EMI Specialist	20	Some	ı	1	,	,	ı	1
29	Manager	30	Medium	'	•	,	1	ı	ı
30	EMI Specialist	20	Detailed	0	0	0	10	80	10

		Estimated	TABLE 6. Estimated Cause of EMI E	6.3 (Continued) Events - Percentages (Section 4.7)	ed) centages (\$	Section 4.7			
Response Number	Work	Experience > Years	Degree of Completion	Pass	Onboard	External	Lighting	Equipment Failure	Unknown
31	EMI Specialist	20	Detailed	0	65		50	0	0
32	EMI Specialist	20	Medium	0	80	10	10	0	0
33	EMI Specialist	30	Detailed	0		0	-	66	0
34	Pilot/Engineer	30	Detailed	0	0	. 0	2	95	0
35	Pilot	30	Some	1	ı	1	ı	ı	ı
36	Pilot	20	Some	ı	ı	•	ı	,	ı
37	Pilot	30	Medium	1	1	•	•	1	1
38	Pilot	30	Detailed	ı	ı	1	1	ı	ī
39	Pilot	30	Medium	1	,		•	ı	1
40	Pilot	30	Medium	1	ı	,	ı	ı	l
41	1	:	i	,	ī	,	•	,	ı
42	EMI Specialist	20	Some	ı	1	ı	1	,	1
43	Engineer/Mgr.	30	Some	ı	ı	ı	ı	ı	ı
44	Pilot	30	Some	1	ı		ı	ı	ı
45	Gov't. Admin.	30	Some	ı	1	ı	ı	ı	ı
46	Engineer	1	ł	,	ı	•	ı	ı	ı
47	Engineer/Mgr.	10	Some	,	ı	ı	ī	1	ı
48	EMI/Manager	20	Some	1	ı	,	ı	ı	ı.
49	EMI/Engineer	30	Medium	ı	1	ī	1	1	1
50	EMI Specialist	10	Medium	1	•	ı	ı	ı	ı
51	Gov't. Admin.	5	Detailed	ı	ı	ı	ı	ı	1
52	Engineer	20	Some	,	1	ı	1	ı	ı
53	EMI/Manager	20	Some	ı	1		ı	ı	ı
54	EMI Specialist	ŀ	Detailed	0	8	m	ю	2	2
55	Pilot	10	Detailed	0	0	0	20	0	20
56	EMI Specialist	20	Detailed	0	8	7	د ر.	0	0
57	EMI Specialist	10	Medium		ı	•	•	•	-

Most = 75, Small = 5 Other: Pilot & Crew Mistakes - 10% To normalize to 100% < 5% = 2.5%, 70% = 65%Other: Pilot Induced - 5%

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	Cause of EMI Eve	Cause of EMI Events - Calculated Percentages (From Data in Table 6.2)	ated Percentage	s (From D	ata in Tal	ble 6.2)		
Work	Experience > Years	Degree of Completion	Pass	Onboard	External	Lighting	Equipment Failure	Unknown
Pilot	20	Detailed	0	20	20	20	20	20
EMI Specialist	10	Medium	1	ı	•	ı	•	l
Manager/Engr.	30	ΞZ	•	•	1		. '	r
EMI Specialist	5	Detailed	0	100	0	0	0	o
Engineer	20	Some	ı	ı	1	, (, (. ?
EMI Specialist	10	Detailed	0	75	0	0	0	23
EMI Specialist	30	Medium	•	1		Į.	1 1	, (
EMI/Pilot	30	Detailed	12.5	37.5	0	25	25	0
Psy/Manager	10	Medium	•	1	r	F	,	1
EMI Specialist	30	Some	1	ı	•	•	1	1
Pilot/Engineer	20	Detailed	0	12.5	25	12.5	25	23
Engineer	30	Some	•	1		ı	•	•
EMI Specialist	30	Detailed	0	33	33	33	0	0
EMI Specialist	38	Detailed	0	33	44	0	11	Π,
Pilot/Engineer	30	Detailed	20	70	27	70	13	o (
EMI Specialist	20	Detailed	0	20	17	17	17	-
EMI Specialist	30	Detailed	100	0	0	0	o ;	<u> </u>
EMI Specialist	30	Detailed	0	20	0	0	50	o (
Engineer	30	Detailed	0	0	∞ -	15	15	79
Engineer/Mgr.	70	Detailed	0	33	0	17	20 	o •
Pilot/Manager	70	Detailed	0	0	20	70	99 ; 	-
EMI Specialist	30	Detailed	0	<i>L</i> 9	0	33	o «	<u> </u>
Pilot/Engineer	30	Detailed	0	71	14	14	0	-
Pilot/Engineer	10	Detailed	0	100	0	<u> </u>	o —	-
Pilot	10	Some	1	•	,	,	1	1
Pilot/Engineer	20	Some	1	ı	,	•	,	. (
Pilot/Engineer	10	Some	0	12	0	0	81	∞
EMI Specialist	20	Some	ı	,	,		•	
Manager	30	Medium	•	ı	1	ı		
EMI Specialist		Detailed	0	0	0	50	20	0

	_	
	Unknown	60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	Equipment Failure	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ble 6.2)	Lighting	0 9 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1
Oata in Ta	External	1000 0 - 1 - 1
ed) es (From I	Onboard	25
l (Continue Percentage	Pass	0040
TABLE 6.4 (Continued) Events - Calculated Percentages (From Data in Table 6.2)	Degree of Completion	Detailed Medium Detailed Some Some Some Some Some Some Some Some
Cause of EMI Eve	Experience > Years	1001 200 1 300 30 1 300 300 300 300 300 300 30
Cau	Work	EMI Specialist EMI Specialist EMI Specialist Pilot Pilot Pilot Pilot Pilot Pilot Pilot Pilot Cov't. Admin. Engineer/Mgr. EMI/Manager EMI/Manager EMI/Manager EMI/Manager EMI/Manager EMI/Manager EMI/Manager EMI/Manager EMI/Specialist Gov't. Admin. Engineer EMI/Pagineer
	Response Number	£ £ £ £ £ 8 £ 8 £ 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

	Correlation Coeficient-r	0.40		0.67		0.18	·	0.92		0.00	0.71		-0.20						-0.09		-0.001	0.97		000			? 	
	Unknown	0	20	5(1)	0	10	<u>্</u>		=	> 5	30	0	100	0	o ·	o ₹	(F)	62	0 (o §) 	o c	_	10(4)) 	o ;	2 0	>
Percentages (From Tables 6.3 and 6.4)	Equipment Failure	0	70	5	ಜ	0	23	9 ;	11) t	3 83	17	0	0	0	20	& :	15	0 ;	9		>	o c	> \	 S 8	. o1	æ 5	OC .
Tables 6	Lighting	50	20	2	જ	35	12.5	10)	3 8	3 52	17	0	0	0	<u> </u>		15	75	20	10	ر د ر		<u>+</u> (-) -	유 6	00
ges (Fron	External	25	20	5	0	35	22	2 :	4 :	20	25	17	0	0	0	0	0	∞	22	8	25	- c	> =	<u>+</u> '	-	-		0
	Onboard	25	2	75	37.5	20	12.5	9 ;	33	ۍ در	3 %	2 1	0	0	100	20		0	0	0	ଛ (۶ <i>چ</i>	÷ 5	17	200	17	o (o
FABLE 6.5	Pass	0	0	S	12.5	0	0	0	0	س (3 ⊂	· c	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.5	-	-	o (o (-	0 (-
TAE ted Percentages vs. C	Estimated/ Calculated	ц	ı O	ш	ပ	田	ပ	ш	U	山 (u د) C	ш	O	'n	O	ш	o _	ш	ပ	ш (U F	т) (ر ر	ш (ပ	ш (ပ
timated Perc	Degree of Completion	Detailed		Detailed	 	Detailed		Detailed		Detailed	Detailed	Crailca	Detailed		Detailed		Detailed		Detailed		Detailed	í	Detailed		Some		Detailed	
Comparison of Estimat	Experience > Years	20	2	30)	20		38		30	ç	27	30		30		30		20		30	ć	30		10		20	
Com	Work	Dilot	LIIOL	EMI/Pilot		Pilot/Engineer	5	EMI Specialist		Pilot/Engineer	Total Care Carlo	EIMI Specialist	EMI Specialist		EMI Specialist	•	Engineer)	Pilot/Manager)	EMI Specialist	(Pilot/Engineer		Pilot/Engineer	··.	EMI Specialist	
	Response	-		~)	11	!	14		15	,	01	17		18		19		21		22		23		27		30	

=

(:	Correlation Unknown Coeficient-r	0 0.47	0 0.99		0 0.97	0	0 0.67	0	0 0.60	2	50 0.79	50	0 0.78	0
6.3 and 6.4	Equipment Failure	0	6 0	9	8	71	95	20	0	7	23	0	0	0
m Tables (Lighting	50	10	9		18	S	20	40	m	23	20	24	ю.
ages (Froi	External	10.	10	13	0	0	0	0	8	n	0	0	24	7
inued) d Percent	Onboard	49	3 &	29	-	7	0	0	4	8	0	0	41	06
TABLE 6.5 (Continued) tages vs. Calculated Per	Pass	00	00	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TABLE entages vs.	Estimated/ Calculated	шζ	ш	ပ	山	O	田	O	ш	Ö	Щ	O	山	O
TABLE 6.5 (Continued) Comparison of Estimated Percentages vs. Calculated Percentages (From Tables 6.3 and 6.4)	Degree of Completion	Detailed	Medium		Detailed		Detailed		Detailed		Detailed		Detailed	
nparison of E	Experience > Years	20	20		30		30		1		10		20	
Con	Work	EMI Specialist	EMI Specialist		EMI Specialist		Pilot/Engineer		EMI Specialist		Pilot		EMI Specialist	
	Response Number	31	32		33		34		54	-	55		56	

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Most = 75, Small = 5 Other: Pilot & Crew Mistakes - 10% To normalize to 100% < 5% = 2.5%, 70% = 65%Other: Pilot Induced - 5%

Comparison of Estimated and	TABLE 6.6 Calculated Percentage	s for External EMI
	21 Data Sets in Table 6.5	13 Data Sets with r>0.61 in Table 6.5
Mean Estimated	12.5	12.1
Mean Calculated	10.3	9.4
Standard Deviation Estimated	15.9	17.5
Standard Deviation Calculated	12.2	13.6
Correlation Between Estimated and Calculated	0.79	0.83

		l							TABLE 6.7	7										
		_		Observation	n Inte	rvals an	d Numb	er of	Incident	Intervals and Number of Incidents for All Upsets - Pilots (Sections 2.1)	Upse	ts - Pilot	s (Secti	ons 2	£					
Response #	Work	Obse	Observation as Pilot	joj.	Obse	Observation as Crew	Crew		Observation as Passenger	28 J		Conversations	Si S		Reports			Arecdotes	<u> </u>	0 - 4
		*	Years	Flights	*	Years	Flights	*	Years	Flights	*	Years	Flights	*	Years	Flights	*	Years	Flights	: e .
-	Pilot	S	52	4000				<u>.</u>				,								_ _
60	Pilot	£	£	0009	,	•			,	·			•			,		,	•	· ———
F	Pilot/Engineer	'n	-	200	ო	9	200	,	•			,			. 4					· §
15	Pilot/Engineer	6 0	8	1800	0		,	0	,		2		, ,	ი {	n ;	· :		,	ě	E 6
21	Pilot/Manager	S	е	ĸ	,					•	: ,		5	R 1	4/	8	z	9	5	<u> </u>
53	Pilot/Engineer	\$	8	1500								•		n	-	ın			•	•
24	Pilot/Engineer	6	8	1400	,	,		,	•	•			r	,				1	,	
æ	Pilot/Engineer		,				,		•		,		•					•	•	•
8	Pilot/Engineer	0	8	3000	,		,	1	•			. 8		,	•			,	,	
22	Pilot/Engineer	12	9	370			,	4	4	8	- ,	3 ,	. ,	. α	, ,	, 8			•	
Ŗ	Pilot/Engineer	4	ĸ	6500	•	,	•			•	5	K		,	v .	3			•	
35	Pilot	0	31	۲		•		0	<u>ج</u>	۰-		· ,	. ,		•		, ,		•	
æ	Pitot		,				,							:	,		~	•		
37	Pilot	٥	8	25,000/hrs	•	,	,			•									,	- 6
88	Pilot	٥	37		,			,	•	•			, ,				•	•		
8	Pilot	4	8	3000						•	,	, ,	•						,	. ,
9	Pilot	y,	×	۰.	'n	ĸ	٥.	,	•	,					•	•		,	,	
4	Pilot	۰	8	۰.		٠.					- -							•		
22	Pilot	8	8	<i>~</i>		•	,										,			
				1536									•	•	•			'	,	

(1) Certification Projects.
(2) Reports of British Airways. N = Numerous, VG = Very Great
(3) Hours of flight time.

TABLE 6.8 Frequency of All Upsets as Observed by Pilots					
Response #	Upsets/Year	Upsets/Flight			
1 8 11 15 23 24 26 27 34 35 37 38 39 40 44 55	0.20 1.00 0.50 0.21 5.00 0.15 0 2.0 0.16 0 0 0.13 0.20 0	1.25×10 ⁻³ 2.17×10 ⁻³ 10×10 ⁻³ 4.4×10 ⁻³ 66×10 ⁻³ 2.1×10 ⁻³ 0 32×10 ⁻³ 0.6×10 ⁻³ - 1.3×10 ⁻³			
Mean	0.63	10.7×10 ⁻³			
Standard Deviation	1.32	20.6×10 ⁻³			

TABLE 6.9
Frequency of HIRF Events - As Observed by Pilots
(Tables 6.2 and 6.8)

		0	Externa bservation		Frequency	Frequency	
Response #	Work	#	Years	Flights	Per Year	Per Flight	
1 8 11 15 21 23 24 25 26	Pilot Pilot/Engineer Pilot Pilot/Engineer Pilot/Manager Pilot/Engineer Pilot/Engineer Pilot/Engineer Pilot/Engineer	1 0 2 4 1 1 0 0	25 13 10 38 - 20 20 - 26	4000 6000 500 1800 - 1500 1400 - 3000	.04 0 .20 .11 - .05 0	.25×10 ⁻³ 0 4×10 ⁻³ 2.2×10 ⁻³ - .67×10 ⁻³ 0 0	
27 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 44 55	Pilot/Engineer Pilot/Engineer Pilot	0 0 0 0 0 0 0	26 37 30 25 28 2	370 6500 ? - 25,000 hrs. 3000 ? ? ?	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .04 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0	
	Mean Standard De	.024	0.45×10 ⁻³ 1.07×10 ⁻³				

	Anecdo	Years		•	'	'				•	•	•	8	•	<u>د</u>		,	ි 	•	- CO	ි 	<u> </u>	•	'
		*	,	•	•	,		٠.	8	,		•	1000		~	2		۰.		4	ĸ	ო		က
	عو	Flights	1	~	۰	,	1	•		٠.	•	•	0009	100,000	•	1000	88	•	r	1	•	•		•
	Reports	Years	1	04	19				8	9	•	•	8	88	•	Ю	83	•	•	,	,	9	,	ĸ
		*	'	\$	4	•	•		5	\$	•	•	200	~	•	2	5	•	•	•	•	•	•	ន
<u></u>	suo.	Flights	,	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	우	28	000 000			•	,	۰.	~	•	•		,
TABLE 6.10 Frequency of All Upsets - Engineers (Sections 2.1)	Conversations	Years		•	•	8		•	8	•		Ψ-	8	×		•	1	•	8	~	,	,	ĸ	•
s (Sex		*				\$	•	'	9	,	,	9	8	٠-	•	,	•	,	-	-	٠	•	80	•
5.10 ngineer	n as jer	Flights		<u>\$</u>		\$	8		2000	•	5	•	•	8	,	000	420	•	200	1500	•		•	,
TABLE 6.10 sets - Engin	Observation as Passenger	Years		^		8	8	٠	8		8		8	ક્ષ		8	83	•	80	8				,
All Up		*		~		•	0	•	~	•	-		0	6	,	2	۰	r	۰	•		,	•	•
ency of	Crew	Flights	,	•	,	,		ć	•	'	•	'	•		•	•	•	•		•		•	,	유
Freque	Observation as Crew	Years		•	,	•	•	15	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	1	•	•		•	•	•
	0	*	•		•	•		г	•	•	;		•			•		•	•	•	,	•		9
	ъ	Flights		,	•	•	,	•	,	•	,	•	<u>8</u>	•	•	ı	•		•		•	•		,
	Observation as Pilot	Years					•			•	i	•	'n	٠	•		•	೫	•	•	•			•
	Observ	*		,		,	,			,	•	•	۰	•	,			'n		,		,		•
	Work		EMI Specialist or Engineer	•	•	*		£		•	•		T	•				5	=	3	5	5		r.
	Response #		2.3.5.9.12. 20.28.32.41. 43.45.46.47. 52.53.56.57	4	v	^	2	t	4	91	47	81	\$	83	&	8	6	æ	2	48	6₽	S	Į,	ž

Fiights

1000

8

No opportunity to observe or no ontact with aircraft, or confidential, or incomplete.

TABLE 6.11
Frequency of All Events as Observed by Passengers
(From Tables 6.7 and 6.10)

Parnana #	Want	Obse	Exter rvation as	nal Passenger	Frequency	Frequency	
Response #	Work	#	Years	Flights	Per Year	Per Flight	
4	EMI Specialist or Engineer	2	7	100	0.28	20×10 ⁻³	
7	п	0	30	100	0	0	
10	"	0	30	500	l o	l ŏ	
14	"	2	20	2000	0.10	1×10 ⁻³	
17	"	1	25	120	0.04	8.3×10 ⁻³	
19	" .	0	30	_	0	0	
22	· "	3	35	200	0.086	15×10 ⁻³	
27	Pilot/Engineer	4	4	120	1.0	33.3×10 ⁻³	
30	EMI Specialist or Engineer	10	25	1000	0.4	10×10 ⁻³	
31	"	0	25	450	0	0	
35	Pilot	0	31	?	0	0	
42	EMI Specialist or Engineer	0	8	200	0	Ö	
48	"	0	23	1500	0	0	
**************************************	Mean				0.15	6.7×10 ⁻³	
	Standard Deviation	0.29	10.5×10 ⁻³				

TABLE 6.12
Frequency of HIRF Events as Reported by Passengers
(From Sec. 4.3 and Table 6.11)

Dognana #	W I.	Obse	Exter	nal Passenger	Frequency	Frequency	
Kesponse #	esponse # Work		Years	Flights	Per Year	Per Flight	
4	EMI Specialist or Engineer	0	7	100	0	0	
7	"	0	30	100	0	l o	
10	n	0	30	500	0	l o	
14	"	0	20	2000	l 0	Ō	
17	"	0	25	120	0	0	
19	"	I	30	_	0.033	_	
22	11	0	35	200	0	0	
27	Pilot/Engineer	0	4	120	l ō	l o	
30	EMI Specialist or Engineer	0	25	1000	0	o	
31	"	3	25	450	0.12	6.7×10-3	
35	Pilot	0	31	?	0	0	
42	EMI Specialist or Engineer	0	8	200	l o	0	
48	11	0	23	1500	0	0	
	Mean	0.12	0.56×10 ⁻³				
	Standard Deviation	0.34	1.93×10 ⁻³				

TABLE 6.13 Frequency of All Events as Observed by Pilots (with r ≥ 0.60 in Table 6.5) (From Table 6.8)						
Response #	Upsets/Year	Upsets/Flight				
8 15 23 27 34 55	1.00 0.21 5.00 2.0 0.16 1.0	2.17×10 ⁻³ 4.4×10 ⁻³ 6.7×10 ⁻³ 32.4×10 ⁻³ 0.61×10 ⁻³ 1.3×10 ⁻³				
Mean	1.56	7.93×10 ⁻³				
Standard Deviation	1.81	12.2×10 ⁻³				

TABLE 6.14 Frequency of All Events as Reported by Passengers (with r ≥ 0.6 in Table 6.5) (From Table 6.11)						
Response # Work Upsets/Year Upsets/Flight						
14 27 30	Pilot/Engineer EMI Specialist or Engineer	0.10 1.0 0.4	1×10 ⁻³ 33.3×10 ⁻³ 10×10 ⁻³			
Mean		0.5	14.8×10 ⁻³			
Standard Deviation		0.4	16.67×10 ⁻³			

TABLE 7.1 Mean Occurrence Rates of Various Events					
Quantity	Quantity Frequency/Year Frequency/1000 Flig				
All EMI Upsets Observed by Pilots	0.66 0.25* 1.56**	5.08 2.60* 7.93**			
HIRF Upsets Observed by Pilots	0.024	0.45			
All EMI Upsets Observed by Passengers	0.15 0.5**	6.7 14.8**			
HIRF Upsets 0.12 0.56 Observed by Passengers					
* With outliers removed. ** Only responses with r > 0.61 considered					

TABLE 7.2 Interval Estimates of Occurrence Rates for Various Events					
Quantity	Frequency/1000 Flights 80% Confidence Interval				
HIRF Upsets Observed by Pilots	0.31 - 0.76				
HIRF Upsets Observed by Passengers	0.25 - 0.93				

Occurrence Rates from	TABLE 7.3 n This Study and Other	r Comparative Studies
Event	Frequency/Hour	Frequency/Flight or Trip
All Upsets Pilots ¹ (Point Estimates)	0.25×10^{-3} 0.66×10^{-3} 1.56×10^{-3}	2.60×10^{-3} 5.08×10^{-3} 7.93×10^{-3}
All Upsets Passengers ² (Point Estimates)	0.15 × 10 ⁻³ 0.5 × 10 ⁻³	6.7 × 10 ⁻³ 14.8 × 10 ⁻³
HIRF Upsets Pilots ³ (Point Estimates) (Interval Estimates)	0.024 × 10 ⁻³	$0.45 \times 10^{-3} \\ 0.31 - 0.76 \times 10^{-3}$
HIRF Upsets Passengers ⁴ (Point Estimates) (Interval Estimates)	0.12 × 10 ⁻³	$0.56 \times 10^{-3} \\ 0.25 - 0.93 \times 10^{-3}$
Rail Fatalities ⁵ (Point Estimates)	0.007 × 10 ⁻⁵	0.014 × 10 ⁻⁵
Bus Fatalities ⁵ (Point Estimates)	0.384 × 10 ⁻⁵	0.768 × 10 ⁻⁵
Scheduled Air Fatalities ⁵ (Point Estimates)	0.209 × 10 ⁻⁵	0.627 × 10 ⁻⁵
Auto Fatalities ⁵ (Point Estimates) ⁶	$0.166 \times 10^{-5} \\ 0.055 \times 10^{-5}$	0.111 × 10 ⁻⁵
General Aviation Fatalities ⁵ (Point Estimates)	3.1 × 10 ⁻⁵	9.3 × 10 ⁻⁵
Average Due to Disease ⁷ (Point Estimates)	1 × 10 ⁻⁶	
Airline Crashes into Mountain in Good Weather and Mechanical Condition ⁸		1.25-5.6 × 10 ⁻⁷

Table 7.1, assume 1000 exposure hours/year

Table 7.1, assume 1000 exposure hours/year

Table 7.1, 7.2, assume 1000 exposure hours/year

Table 7.1, 7.2, assume 1000 exposure hours/year

⁵ Shooman, Table J-3, p. 630, based on a NYC to Washington DC "average trip"

Department of Transportation, May 1988, assume 10,000 miles driven/year and an average of 25 mph. = 400 hr./year

⁷ Shooman, Fig. J-1, p. 624 "average trip"

Fragola and Shooman, 1992

APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE AND MAILING TO THE PARTICIPANTS

The following 16 page questionnaire was sent to the respondents along with the cover letter dated on May 4, 1992.

A copy of the reminder letter, dated August 12, 1992, and sent to participants to encourage additional responses is included.

SCHOOL OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND COMPUTER SCIENCE

516-755-4290

Polytechnic

Dr. Martin L. Shooman
Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Polytechnic University - Long Island Campus
Route 110
Farmingdale, NY 11735

May 4, 1992

UNEXPLAINED AIRCRAFT UPSET QUESTIONNAIRE

INTRODUCTION:

Dear Professional:

Your are being asked to participate in an important data collection effort on Aircraft Safety. In recent years, many anecdotal reports (stories) have appeared regarding the upset (disruption) of avionics systems. I am presently working to collect data on the frequency, nature, and severity of such interrupt events under a NASA Grant. This data will be used to help determine if further study is needed and to assign research priorities. Some of these events have been previously studied or are well known, e.g. lightning, interference of passenger electronics equipment. However, the effects and importance of system failures due to malfunctions and external radio interference (sometimes called High Intensity Radio Frequency Interference, HIRF) are less well studied.

I am sure you appreciate that some of this information is considered sensitive or proprietary by manufacturers, airlines, and others. In addition some of the suspected sources of interference are military or covert activities. Thus, it was decided to use an "Anonymous Expert Questionnaire" to develop some of this data. No names will appear in the reporting of this data and the sources will only be described as to the numbers or percentages of airline captains, avionics engineers, airline maintenance personnel, etc. who responded to the questionnaire.

I would like to acknowledge the help of the following individuals who critiqued this questionnaire and supplied the names of most of the professionals to whom this was sent:

Joe Fragola, SAIC Gerry Fuller, CKC Labs Herbert Hecht, SoHar Inc. Rowena Morrison, NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System Felix Pitts, NASA Langley Ronald Rogers, Airline Pilots Association

Before completing this questionnaire, please suggest or send copies to other knowledgeable colleagues who should also complete this questionnaire. (Please read question 8 and make copies if appropriate). Complete and return this questionnaire even if you know of zero incidents of upsets since this is also valid data. Your cooperation, help, time and suggestions are much appreciated.

Please send the completed questionnaire to my Secretary, JoAnn McDonald, in the enclosed stamped, self-addressed envelope, (within two weeks of receipt if possible).

Sincerely, martin L. Shoomer

Martin L. Shooman

New York City: 333 Jay Street Brooklyn, NY 11201 718-260-3600 FAX 7182603136 Long Island: Route 110 Farmingdale, NY 11735 516-755-4400 FAX 5167554404 Westchester: 36 Saw Mill River Road Hawthorne, NY 10532 914-347-6940 FAX 9143476939

1.0 YOUR FIELD OF EXPERTISE

1.1 Your Profession an	d Employment (Check all that	apply)	
Military Pilot Commercial Pilot NonSched Pilot Corporate Pilot Aerospace Engineer Physicist Manager EMI Specialist Other (specify)	Military Crew Member Commercial Crew Member NonSched Crew Member Corporate Crew Member Electrical Engineer Mathematician Mechanical Engineer Government Administration	Commercial NonSched A Corporate A Airframe ma Airframe ma Avionics* m	craft Maintenance Aircraft Maintenance ircraft Maintenance ircraft Maintenance inufacturer (military) inufacturer (commercial) ianufacturer (military)
* Avionics includes inst	rumentation, navigation, contro	ol, etc.	
Other (specify)	erience in Your Field: 20 years > 10 years > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >		
Commercial	ssociated with 10ur Profession.	ai Experience:	
☐ Wide Body ☐ Business Jets ☐ Airship ☐ Other (specify)_	☐ Narrow Body ☐ Heavy Twin Turboprop ☐ Single Engine Turboprop	Helicopter	Regional Jets
<u>Military</u>			
Fighter Transport Other (specify)	☐ Recon ☐ Tanker	Bomber Airship	☐ Fighter/Bomber ☐ Helicopter

Commercial					
DC-60 Airship	☐ A310 ☐ 707-720 ☐ 777 G☐ MD-80 ☐ DC-SUPER 7			☐ A340 ☐ 747-400 ☐ 737-500 ☐ DC-8 ☐ L1011	☐ A300-600 ☐ 757 ☐ 727-STD ☐ DC-10
Business Jet					
Gulfstrea Gulfstrea Other (sp	arjet 25D,256 C nm II C nm IV C	Cessna Citation II Gates Learjet 35,364 Gulfstream IIB Beech Jet 400 II	Gates L	Citation III earjet 55 eam III et 400 III	
Beech K Piper Mo Piper T- Cessna T	1020 Win Utiliner 402C	Beech 1900C Beech Super 200 Piper 400LS CL Piper T-1040 Cessna-Chancel	Pipo EY IIIA Pipo Ces lor Ces	rchild Metro III er Chieftain er Seneca sna Twin Conqu sna 421	
Military/Go	<u>vernment</u>				
☐ F-111 ☐ C-5A1B	☐ F-14 ☐ B-52		Helicopter		

2.0 FREQUENCY OF AVIONICS UPSETS* (Check all that apply)

The term upset is defined to mean any significant deviation from expected behavior which is more than a nuisance and might compromise aspects of the flight.

If you

2.1	Frequency of Upsets:				
	Estimate the number of incidents, an have <u>not</u> observed any such upsets en	d the numbers of ter 0 as the numb	years and er of incid	flights to the best o lents since 0 inciden	f your ability. If yo ts is important data.
	Personal Observation as a pilot Number of incidents	Over	years	Covering	_ flights
	Personal observation as a crew m Number of incidents		years	Covering	_ flights
	Personal observation as a passeng Number of incidents		years	Covering	: _ flights
	Conversations with others who w			Covering	_ flights
	Study of data or reports Number of incidents	Over	years	Covering	_ flights
	Study of anecdotal (stories) according Number of incidents		_ years	Covering	_ flights
	Other			 	
2.2	Types of Aircraft Affected by Upse	t Incidents (Chec	k all that	apply):	
	Commercial				
	☐ Wide Body ☐ Narrow Bo	ody [☐ Feeder	Jets Reg	ional Jets
	☐ Business Jets ☐ Heavy Tw	in Turboprop	Light 1	Twin Turboprop	
	☐ Airship ☐ Helicopter	r [☐ Single	Engine Turboprop	
	Other (specify)				

<u>Military</u>		
☐ Fighter ☐ Recon	Bomber	Fighter/Bomber
☐ Transport ☐ Tanke	er Helicopter	Airship Airship
Other (specify)		
•		
2.3 Specific Aircraft Affected by U	pset Incidents (Check all that ap	oply):
Commercial		
□ A300 □ A310	□ A320 □ A336	A340 A300-600
747-100 707-720	747-200,300 747	-SP
□ 767 □ 777	737-200,300 737-	400
☐ 727-LONG☐ MD-80	□ MD-11 □ MD	-90 DC-8 DC-10
DC-60 DC-SUPER	70 DC-9,10,20 DC-	30,40
Airship	Helicopter	
Other (specify)		
Business Jet		
Cessna Citation I	Cessna Citation II	Cessna Citation III
		Gates Learjet 55
Gulfstream II	_	Gulfstream III
	<u>.</u> –	Beech Jet 400 III
Turbo Prop	_	
Beech Airliner C-99	☐ Beech 1900C	☐ Fairchild Metro III & V
Beech King Air F90-1	Beech Super 200,B200	Piper Chieftain
Piper Mojave	☐ Piper 400LS CLEY IIIA	☐ Piper Seneca
Piper T-1020	☐ Piper T-1040	Cessna Twin Conquest II
Cessna Twin Utiliner 402C	Cessna-Chancellor	Cessna 421
Other (specify)		

<u>Milit</u>	ary/Govern	ment				•
	C-5A1B		□ _{B-1}	Airship		
Цc	Other (specif	y)				
IF YO	DU HAVE E	EXPERIENCED 0	UPSETS OF A	NY KIND PLEASE	SKIP TO QUESTION	N 7.
3.0 CON	DITION UI	NDER WHICH UI	PSETS OCCUR			
3.1 <u>Do S</u>	uch Upsets	Occur on:				
□ та	axing ow-level Fli	ight 🔲 Flight M	aneuvers 🔲 1	Straight and level F Don't know Low Traffic	High Traff	Flight
3.2 <u>Unde</u>	r What Wea	uther Conditions:				
CI CI He	ear, good viouds or Rai		y Not sign	ificant	☐ Rain*, mediun☐ Don't know	n visibility
* Or o	ther precip	itation				
3.3 Level	of Avionics	Maintenance Wh	en Upsets Occu	rred:		
□ Go	ood conditio	n Needed s	ervicing [Under service	Problems with a pa	

WE WISH MORE DETAILS ON THE NATURE OF THE UPSETS YOU REPORTED IN QUESTION 2.0. PLEASE COMPLETE QUESTIONS 4 AND 5 TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY FOR ALL THE INCIDENTS YOU REMEMBER.

		von of	the sou	rce of upset	? Cir	cle approp	riate n	umber:			
لـ	Other (specify	/)				•					
	Unknown or										
	Computer	Пт	ape play	er/recorde	r	CD	Player	r		ir to	Ground Phone
	AM Radio	□ F	M Radio)		☐ Sho	rt Wav	e Radio	Пτ	ransm	itter
	Source:										
	*Radio freque the aircraft.	ency in	terferen	ce affecting	an ai	rcraft syste	m caus	ed by pas	senge	r equi	ipment operati
1	Passenger RI	1*									
v	CAUSE AND	EFFE(CT OF I	UPSET							
Λ											

System or subsystem a	ffected:		
Autopilot	Panel Lights	Cabin Lights	Communications Equipment
Navigation equipment	☐ Flaps	☐ Spoilers	Landing Gear (Auto Braking/Anti Skid)
Engine Controls	Rotor Controls	s Instrumentation	Airship Gas Lift Controls
Window Heat	☐ Intercom	Ailerons	Cabin Pressure & Temperature
Rudder	☐ Elevators	Nose Wheel Steeri	ng
Other (specify)			

How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle appropriate number:

No Idea			Maybe Possibly Probably Cert					Certai	-		
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

How do you know the system/subsystem?_____

Onboard RFI " "										
Radio frequency interstem.	ference	caused	by one	on board	system	affecting	the o	perati	on of a	inother o
Source:										
VHF-UHF Transmitte	r	□ нія	gh Frequ	uency Tra	nsmitte	r 🗀	Rada	ır		
Countermeasures Equi	pment	Pov	wer Soui	rce			Inter	com		
Navigation Equipment		Co	mputer				Unkı			
Other (specify)	•									
How sure are you of th	e sour	ce of up	set? Ci	rcle appro	priate r	umber:				
How sure are you of the No Idea 0 1			e	Possibly		Probabl	y 8	9	Certa	in
No Idea 0 ! How do you know the	2 source?	Maybe	4	Possibly 5	6	Probably	8	9		<u>in</u>
No Idea 0 1 How do you know the second sec	2 source?	Maybe	4	Possibly 5	6	Probably	8	9	10	
No Idea 0 1 How do you know the	2 source!	Maybo	4 Pan	Possibly 5 el Lights	6	Probably 7	8	9	10 Cabin	in
No Idea O I How do you know the second sec	2 source!	Maybo	4 Pan	Possibly 5 el Lights	6 quipmer	Probably 7	8	, 	10 Cabin Flaps	Lights
No Idea O 1 How do you know the second sec	2 source? fected	Maybo	Pan Nav	Possibly 5 el Lights	quipmer anding	7 7 nt Gear	8	,	Cabin Flaps Engine	

How do you know the system/subsystem?_____

4	3	Ext	err	ıal	R	FI	*	*	*

*** Radio frequency interference installation, etc.) which affect	te from a source outside the aircraft (acts systems within the aircraft (often cal	another aircraft, a ship, a ground led HIRF).
Source:		
Commercial AM Transmitter Voice of America Transmitter Military Radar Landbased military radar Hand-held (Walkie-Talkies) Air Mobile Transmitter Other (specify)	☐ Air Traffic Control Radar ☐ Shipboard military radar ☐ Unknown ☐ Airport Fixed Transmitter	Commercial Short Wave Transmitte Weather Radar Airborne military radar VLF/LF Transmitter Car Mobile Transmitter
	of upset? Circle appropriate number: Maybe Possibly Probably 3 4 5 6 7	7 Certain 8 9 10
How do you know the source?_		
System or subsystem affected:		
☐ Autopilot ☐ Communications Equipment	Panel Lights Navigation equipment	☐ Cabin Lights ☐ Flaps
Spoilers	Automated Landing Gear	Engine Controls
	Airship Gas Lift controls	Instrumentation
Other		
	ed system or subsystem? Circle the app Maybe Possibly Probabl	
No Idea 0 1 2	3 4 5 6 7	8 9 10
How do you know the system/s	ubsystem?	

4.4 <u>Light</u>	ning										
Sourc	e:										
Electi	rostatic Disc	harge	(ESD)	, [ike-Airboi	na.	□ St	rika C	Found	Ī
	-Indirect	,a. 60	(LOD)	-		Elmo's Fir			rike-O	rounc	1
	(specify)_				- → 31.	Eimos Fii	e				
- Other	(specify)_										
How s	sure are you	of th	e sour	ce of unse	t? Ci	rcle the an	nronris	ate numb	er.		
						Possibly					Certain
	0	ſ				5			 8	9	10
How o	lo you know	the s	ource?								
	n or subsyst										
☐ Autop											
				-		ights					Lights
	unications	Equip	ment	P		tion equip					
ן Spoile					utom	ated Landi	ng Gea	r	LE	ngine	Controls
Helico ا	pter Rotor	Contr	ols		irship	Gas Lift	control	S		nstrun	nentation
Other	(specify)			.,							
How s	ure are you	of the	affec	ted system	n or si	uhsystem?	Circle	the enn	rancia	ta mum	shori
						Possibly					
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
How d	o you know	the s	ystem/	subsystem	ı?						
.5 <u>Equip</u> n	nent Failure	2									
Source	:										
Interm Other_	ittent	Пτ	ransie	nt [] Har	d Failures	□ EI	ectrostat	ic Disc	charge	r.
	re are you						numh	er:			
	No Idea					Possibly					Certain
	0	1	2							9	10

	How do	you know	the s	ource?							
	System (or subsyste	m afi	[ected:	:						
	Autopile Communication Spoilers Helicopiles Other (s	or subsystement of the content of th	Equip: Contro	ment ols	□ P	Automa	ion equipa ted Landi Gas Lift	ng Gea	 ☐ F	laps ngine nstrum	Controls nentation
		•			-		-				Certain
		0					Possibly 5		 8	9	10
	How do	you know	the s	ystem,	/subsysten	n?			 		
4.6	Unknow	n Source									
	System o	or subsyste	m afí	ected:	:						
	Spoilers Helicopt	ot nications F ter Rotor (pecify)	Contro	ols	□ N □ A □ A	utoma irship	ion equipi ted Landi Gas Lift (ng Geai	□ F	laps ngine	Controls nentation
		e are you o			•		•		 _		
	••						5				
4.7	Cause of	you know Upset What Per									
Dec	nangar Pi	C1) iah	ting				
		FI I				Equi	pment Fa	ilure_	 -		
Ext	ernal RF	I					nown Sou				
		fy)									

5.0 CRITICALLY OF UPSETS

5.1 Passenger RFI

How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Passenger RFI:

Normal		Nuisance		Concern	ı	Emergency		Injuries		Catastrophic
*************	******	***********		****	······	Procedures	********	Damage	********	Total Loss
O	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

5.2 Onboard Systems RFI

How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Onboard RFI:

Normal		Nuisance		Concern		Emergency		Injuries		Catastrophic
		**********		************		Procedures		Damage		Total Loss
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	0	10

5.3 External RFI (HIRF)

How Critical Are The Upsets Due to External RFI (HIRF):

Normal		Nuisance		Concern		Emergency		Injuries		Catastrophic
***************************************		************				Procedures		Damage		Total Loss
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

5.4 Lightning

How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Lighting:

Normal		Nuisance		Concern		Emergency		Injuries		Catastrophic
	-	***************************************		******		Procedures	•	Damage		Total Loss
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Ŕ	ā	10

5.5 Avionics Equipment Failure

How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Avionics Equipment Failure:

Normal		Nuisance		Concern		Emergency		Injuries		Catastrophic
***************************************	***************************************	********	***	*************************	********	Procedures	*****	Damage		Total Loss
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

5.6 Unknown Source

How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Unknown Sources:

Normal		Nuisance		Concern		Emergency		Injuries		Catastrophic
	*********		*******	*******	***********	Procedures		Damage		Total Loss
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

6.0 DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS

Now that you have reported on overall aspects of avionics upsets you are asked to give more specific details of such incidents. Please focus on those you think were most significant.

6.1 <u>If</u>	you have detailed knowledge of any upset events please describe them below:
My	descriptions are based on:
	Personal Observation
	Reliable and detailed report from a second party
	Study of data based on reliable reports of observers
	Other (specify)
	Don't have detailed information
6.2	Please give a brief description of the events, including aircraft, flight condition, airport or location weather, maintenance conditions, source of upset, how determined, effect, severity, criticality, etc.):
Event	1:
Event	2:

re room is needed for more details or additional events.)
ILE A LIST OF PUBLISHED REPORTS AND ARTICLES ABOUT UP
CY OR SEVERITY DATA REPORTED ON UPSET EVENTS DUE 1
for more details.
for more details:
e with data:
for more details:

	Articles/Reports in the literature with data:
	·
7.3	External RFI
	Source of data:
	Person/Organization to Contact for more details:
	Articles/Reports in the literature with data:
7.4	Lightning
	Source of data:
	Person/Organization to Contact for more details:
	Articles/Reports in the literature with data:

	vionics Equipment Failure	
So	ource of data:	
_		
Pe	erson/Organization to Contact for more details:	
_		
Αı	rticles/Reports in the literature with data:	
A	DDITIONAL INFORMATION	
<u>w</u>	ho else has information on avionics upsets and should be sent a copy of this form and asked	to rest
Е	I have made copies of this form and sent it to colleagues for their completion.	
	Shooman please send copies to the following individuals:	
	encommunity produce contact to the following individuals.	
ntac	et 1:	
ntac 		
ntac 		
	et 1:	
ntac	et 1:	
ntac	et 1:	
ntac	et 1:	

	litional Comments	
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND HELP IN CONTRIBUTING TO THIS IMPORTANT STUDY OF AIRCRAFT SAFETY

SCHOOL OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND COMPUTER SCIENCE

Computer Science Department 516/755-4290

Polytechnic

E-MAIL: shooman@prism.poly.edu

August 12, 1992

Dear Participant:

Some time ago I sent you a copy of a questionnaire requesting your experiences concerning the frequency and effects of radio frequency interference on aircraft systems.

If you have not filled out the form and responded, I would appreciate it if you could take some time to complete and return the form. Your response would be much appreciated, even if you have never observed this phenomena.

Very truly yours,

Martin L. Shooman

Professor of Electrical Engineering

utu L. Shoom

and Computer Science

MLS/jam

New York City: 333 Jay Street Brooklyn, NY 11201 718-260-3600 FAX 7182603136 Long Island: Route 110 Farmingdale, NY 11735 516-755-4400 FAX 5167554404

Westchester: 36 Saw Mill River Road Hawthorne, NY 10532 914-347-6940 FAX 9143476939

APPENDIX B

EXPERIENCE DATA

The information for many of the questions on the questionnaire can be summarized by adding all the responses for the 57 respondents. Rather than create a large set of tables, the data was listed on a copy of the response form which follows in this appendix. The total number of responses are listed to the left of each item. Clearly, there are more responses than 57. For example respondent #1 checked: military pilot, commercial pilot, aerospace engineer, manager, and mechanical engineer in response to question 1.1.

For question 1.1, seven "other" responses were received and are listed on the last line for this section. The notation FAA [2] means that two respondents said they worked for the FAA during some portion of their career. Brackets were used to indicate multiple responses for other questions as well.

In section 4.1 twelve sources were checked, with unknown accounting for five of these responses. Only eight respondents checked a number under "how sure are you of the source of upset": 7,10,7,10,0,0,1,7. The average was 5.3 and the standard deviation 4.3. In some cases respondents checked more than one source and circled an "average surety" or checked one or more sources but left blank the question on surety. Similar comments hold for the other subsections of Sec. 4.0 and 5.0.

1.0 YOUR FIELD OF EXPERTISE

1.1 Your Profession and	d Employment (Check a	all that apply)		
 10 Military Pilot 13 Commercial Pilot 2 NonSched Pilot 4 Corporate Pilot 10 Aerospace Engineer 4 Physicist 15 Manager 15 EMI Specialist 	0 Military Crew Mo 2 Commercial Crew 0 NonSched Crew NonSched Engine 1 Mathematician 5 Mechanical Engine 4 Government Adm	v Member 1 Member 1 Member 2 er 4 neer 5	Commission vian / timeral	Maintenance Maintenance Maintenance rer (military) rer (commercial) urer (military)
EMC Cor Pilot/Cre NASA FAA [2]	Components Manufactu nsultant w Member Flight Testin Aviation Pilot			
* Avionics includes instr	rumentation, navigation	, control, etc.		
1.2 Total Years of Expe	rience in Your Field:			
			1 .	
L > 30 years L >	20 years $\square > 10$ years	; L → 5 years L	J > 1 year	
Other (specify)_				
1.3 Types of Aircraft As	ssociated with Vous Dro	fossional Famorica		
Commercial	sociated with rour Fro	iessional Experienc	<u>ce</u> :	
27 Wide Body 19 Business Jets 0 Airship	21 Narrow Body 10 Heavy Twin T 7 Single Engine		ght Twin Turboprop	7 Regional Jets
8 Other: IC Engine Single Eng CV 440 L-188 (Ele	gine Piston	DC-9 B727 Cessna 310 Cessna Aero Comi	mander	
<u>Military</u>				
20 Fighter 17 Transport	10 Recon 8 Tanker	13 Bo 0 Air		Fighter/Bomber Helicopter
3 Other: Trainer [2]	1			

Commercial

6	A300	5	A310	5	A320	4	A330	3	A340	2 A300-600
_	747-100	9	707-720	10	747-200,300	8	747-SP	5	747-400	4 757
	767	6	777	4	737-200,300	4	737-400	4	737-500	11 727-STD
12	727-LONG	8	MD-80	7	MD-11	2	MD-90	1	DC-8	4 DC-10
	DC-60	1	DC-SUPER 70	9	DC-9,10,20	2	DC-30,40	12	L1011	
	Airship 600 [2]				_ 7 Helicopte	r <u>ME</u>	3X,206,212.	412.	214, helice	opter [2]
										,
15	Other (specify)									

13 Other (specia

Business Jet

Turbo Prop

3 Beech Airliner C-99	4 Beech 1900C	4 Fairchild Metro III & V
3 Beech King Air F90-1	7 Beech Super 200,B200	2 Piper Chieftain
2 Piper Mojave	3 Piper 400LS CLEY IIIA	3 Piper Seneca
2 Piper T-1020	3 Piper T-1040	2 Cessna Twin Conquest II
2 Cessna Twin Utiliner 402C	3 Cessna-Chancellor	2 Cessna 421
21 Other (specify)		

Military/Government

3 F-111	5 F-14	8 F-18	9 Helicopter
2 C-5A1B	2 B-52	5 B-1	0 Airship
69 Other (specify)			

2.0 FREQUENCY OF AVIONICS UPSETS* (Check all that apply)

The term upset is defined to mean any significant deviation from expected behavior which is more than a

	nuisance and might	compromise aspects of the flig	ht.		
2.1	Frequency of Upset	<u>s</u> :			
	Estimate the number not observed any suc	of incidents, and the numbers th upsets enter 0 as the number	of years an	nd flights to the best of your ability. If you hats since 0 incidents is important data.	ave
	Personal Observa	ation as a pilot		·	
	Number of i	ncidents Over	years	Covering flights	
	Personal observa	tion as a crew member			
	Number of in	ncidents Over	years	Covering flights	
	Personal observa	tion as a passenger			-
	Number of in	ncidents Over	years	Covering flights	
	Conversations wi	th others who were personal o	bservers		
			*	Covering flights	
	Study of data or	reports			
	Number of in	acidents Over	years	Covering flights	
	Study of anecdot	al (stories) accounts			
			years	Covering flights	
	Other				
			•		
2.2	Types of Aircraft At	Tected by Upset Incidents (Ch	eck all that	t apply):	
	Commercial				
	15 Wide Body	14 Narrow Body	2 Feeder	Jets 4 Regional Jets	
	7 Business Jets 2 Airship	8 Heavy Twin Turboprop 5 Helicopter	3 Light T	Twin Turboprop Engine Turboprop	
	3 Other Single Engin	e Piston [2], Confidential			

Military

9 Fighter 2 Recon 3 Bomber 5 Helicopter 5 Fighter/Bomber

5 Transport

2 Tanker

0 Airship

3 Other:

Space Shuttle, Special Purpose Transport, Trainer

2.3 Specific Aircraft Affected by Upset Incidents (Check all that apply):

Commercial

2 A300 1 A310 6 747-100 3 707-720 3 767 0 777 5 727-LONG 6 MD-80 0 DC-60 0 DC-SUPER	1 A320 4 747-200,300 2 737-200,300 1 MD-11 70 5 DC-9,10,20 3 Helicopter	0 A330 1 747-SP 0 737-400 0 MD-90 0 DC-30,40	0 A340 0 747-400 0 737-500 2 DC-8 7 L1011	0 A300-600 2 757 4 727-STD 3 DC-10
---	--	--	---	---

5 Other: CV580, CV440, Fan Trainer, Diamona, SF-25C

Business Jet

3 Cessna Citation III 1 Cessna Citation II 1 Cessna Citation I 0 Gates Learjet 55 1 Gates Learjet 25D,256 1 Gates Learjet 35,36A 0 Gulfstream III 0 Gulfstream IIB 2 Gulfstream II 0 Beech Jet 400 III 0 Beech Jet 400 II 0 Gulfstream IV

3 Other: Cessna Citation V, BA-125-800, Falcon 900

Turbo Prop

0 Beech 1900C 1 Fairchild Metro III & V 1 Beech Airliner C-99 1 Piper Chieftain 0 Beech Super 200,B200 1 Beech King Air F90-1 0 Piper 400LS CLEY IIIA O Piper Seneca 1 Piper Mojave 1 Cessna Twin Conquest II 0 Piper T-1020 0 Piper T-1040 0 Cessna 421 0 Cessna-Chancellor 0 Cessna Twin Utiliner 402C

7 Other: Pilatus PC-9, Piper Malibu (Piston), Beechcraft Bonanza, CU580, ATR43, Dash8, 5340

Military/Government

 2 F-111
 1 F-14
 4 F-18
 7 Helicopter Blackhawk, Appache, helicopter [5]

 1 C-5A1B
 2 B-52
 3 B-1
 0 Airship

15 Other: A-7, C-130 [2], Army RC-12 Series, Tornado [3], F-15, OV-1D, T-37, T-38, C-17, Classified, F-16, F-4

IF YOU HAVE EXPERIENCED 0 UPSETS OF ANY KIND PLEASE SKIP TO OUESTION 7.

3.0 CONDITION UNDER WHICH UPSETS OCCUR

3.1 Do Such Upsets Occur on:

6 Landing 7 Takeoff 18 Straight and level Flight 8 Ascent 11 Descent

4 Taxing 7 Parked 0 Don't know 0 Formation Flight 5 Low-level Flight 4 Flight Maneuvers 2 Low Traffic 1 High Traffic

8 Other Earth orbit, ground checkout, EMC test program, cloud penetrations, any condition [2], helicopter

ground run [2]

3.2 Under What Weather Conditions:

16 Clear, good visibility 3 Cloudy, medium visibility 5 Rain*, medium visibility

9 Clouds or Rain*, Poor Visibility 11 Not significant 2 Don't know

1 Hot 1 Cold

2 Other: ENC Test program, not important except for lightening

3.3 Level of Avionics Maintenance When Upsets Occurred:

17 Good condition 0 Needed servicing 0 Under service 3 Problems with a particular unit

3 Not significant 3 Don't know 9 Design problem with a particular subsystem

^{*} Or other precipitation

WE WISH MORE DETAILS ON THE NATURE OF THE UPSETS YOU REPORTED IN QUESTION 2.0. PLEASE COMPLETE OUESTIONS 4 AND 5 TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY FOR ALL THE INCIDENTS YOU REMEMBER.

4.0 CAUSE AND EFFECT OF UPSET

4.1 Passenger RFI*

*Radio frequency interference affecting an aircraft system caused by passenger equipment operating inside the aircraft.

Source:

1 AM Radio

0 FM Radio

1 Short Wave Radio

1 Transmitter

1 Computer

0 Tape player/recorder

0 CD Player

2 Air to Ground Phone

5 Unknown or difficult to determine source

1 Other:

Ground Sources

How sure are you of the source of upset? Circle appropriate number: 7,10,7,10,0,0,1,7:

Average

= 5.3

= 4.3Standard Deviation

No Idea			Maybe		Possibly		Probably			Certain	
0	· 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

How do you know the source?_

System or subsystem affected:

3 Autopilot

0 Panel Lights

0 Cabin Lights

2 Communications Equipment

4 Navigation equipment

0 Flaps

0 Spoilers

0 Landing Gear (Auto Braking/Anti Skid)

0 Engine Controls

0 Rotor Controls 2 Instrumentation

0 Airship Gas Lift Controls

0 Window Heat

1 Intercom 0 Elevators

0 Ailerons

1 Cabin Pressure & Temperature

0 Rudder

1 Other: Radio

How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle appropriate number: 10,10,9,10,10,0,2,10:

0 Nose Wheel Steering

Average

= 7.6

Standard Deviation

= 4.1

No Idea			Maybe		Possibly		robably		pes cos 100 ES &:	Certain
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

How do you know the system/subsystem? Saw and heard oxygen masks deployed

4.2 Onboard RF

** Padio fragues	ncy interference caused by	one on hoard system affecting	g the operation of another on l	onard system
Kadio i reduei	nev interrerence caused by	die dii doard system arrectin	k the oberation of another on t	Juai u system.

Source:

14 VHF-UHF Transmitter7 Countermeasures Equipment

13 High Frequency Transmitter

9 Radar 2 Intercom

5 Navigation Equipment

4 Computer

5 Power Source

4 Unknown

7 Other (specify)___

Average

= 8.8

Standard Deviation

= 2.4

No Idea		Maybe		Possibly Probably			у	Certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

How do you know the source?_

System or subsystem affected:

9 Autopilot

19 Communications Equipment0 Spoilers

1 Helicopter Rotor Controls
7 Other (specify)

0 Panel Lights

14 Navigation equipment0 Automated Landing Gear

O Automated Landing Gear
O Airship Gas Lift controls

0 Cabin Lights

0 Flaps

2 Engine Controls 10 Instrumentation

How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle appropriate number: 9,9,10,6,10,10,9,10,9,10,10,6,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10.

Average

= 8.8

Standard Deviation

= 2.5

No Idea Ma			Maybe		Possibly		Probably	,		Certain	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

How do you know the system/subsystem?_____

4.3 External RFI ***

*** Radio frequency interference from a source outside the aircraft (another aircraft, a ship, a ground installation, etc.) which affects systems within the aircraft (often called HIRF).

Source:

1 Commercial AM Transmitter 6 Voice of America Transmitter 6 Military Radar 2 Landbased military radar 2 Hand-held (Walkie-Talkies) 0 Air Mobile Transmitter	3 Commercial FM Transmitter 1 Air Traffic Control Radar 5 Shipboard military radar 0 Unknown 0 Airport Fixed Transmitter	 2 Commercial Short Wave Transmitter 0 Weather Radar 1 Airborne military radar 0 VLF/LF Transmitter 0 Car Mobile Transmitter
--	--	---

3 Other: ECM and Jammer Equipment, Confidential reports

How sure are you of the source of upset? Circle appropriate number: 7,10,10,10,4,8,10,10,10,6,9,10,10:

Average = 8.9 Standard Deviation = 1.9

No Idea		DO 1870 800 FF FF	Maybe		Possibly		Probably			Certain		
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

How do you know the source?_____

System or subsystem affected:

4 Autopilot 6 Communications Equipment 0 Spoilers 3 Helicopter Rotor Controls	1 Panel Lights4 Navigation equipment2 Automated Landing Gear0 Airship Gas Lift controls	0 Cabin Lights 0 Flaps 4 Engine Controls 4 Instrumentation
0 Other	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	***

How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle the appropriate number: 10,10,10,3,10,10,10,6,10,10,

10: Average = 9.0 Standard Deviation = 2.3

No Idea			Maybe	e Possibly Probably			Certain				
0]	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

How do you know the system/subsystem?_____

4.4	Lightning
	C-

Standard Deviation = 1.3

No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10				******	**** *** *** *** **		******** *** * *** *** ***		2024 D40 D00 C00 O		******	******
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Certain

How do you know the source?_____

System or subsystem affected:

0

1

2

3

7 Autopilot 0 Panel Lights 2 Cabin Lights
10 Communications Equipment 11 Navigation equipment 0 Flaps
0 Spoilers 0 Automated Landing Gear 2 Engine Controls
0 Helicopter Rotor Controls 0 Airship Gas Lift controls 9 Instrumentation

How sure are you of the affected system or subsystem? Circle the appropriate number: 10,6,10,10,7,10,8,10,10,7,9,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,8:

5

6

7

8

10

Average = 9.1 Standard Deviation = 1.4

No Idea Maybe Possibly Probably Certain

4

How do you know the system/subsystem?_____

4.5 Equipment Failure

Source:

9 Intermittent 12 Transient 8 Hard Failures 0 Electrostatic Discharge 0 Other____

How sure are you of the sources? Circle the appropriate number: 7,5,8,7,9,10,7,10,10,0,10,8,10,10,3,10,4,7,10,10,6, 10: Average = 7.8

Standard Deviation = 2.8

	No Idea Maybe				Possibly	Probably			Certain		
Λ	1	2	2	A	5		-		~	•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	
v	Ţ	2	2	4)	D	,	8	9	10	

How d	o you know	the sou	rce?							_		
Systen	or subsyste	m affec	cted:									
0 Spoilers 1 Helicopt	ot nications Equ ter Rotor Co ecify)	7 Navig 0 Autor 0 Airsh	1 Panel Lights 7 Navigation equipment 0 Automated Landing Gear 0 Airship Gas Lift controls				0 Cabii 0 Flaps 7 Engii 9 Instru					
How sure 10,6,10:			=	tem or sub 7.9 2.3	system	n? Circle t	he ap	propriate	numbe	er: 7,5	,10,7,10,6	,10,8,10,10,7,3,
	No Ide	a		Maybe		Possibly	!!! !!	Probabl	y	, ,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	Certain	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
	do you know own Source	the sys	stem/s	ubsystem?								-
	m or subsyst	em affe	cted:									
0 Spoilers 0 Helicop	inications Eq	ntrols		2 4 1140	gation mated	ts equipment Landing s Lift con	Gear		0 Cabi 2 Flap 3 Engi 3 Instr	s ine Co umen	ontrols	· 2.21.
Average	are you of to	= 8.8	ected s	ystem or s	ubsyst	em? Circ	le the	appropri	ate nur	nber:	9,10,8,9,8	,10,6,10:
	No Ide			Maybe	*** *** *** ***							******
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	. 8	9	10	
How	do you know	the sy	stem/s	subsystem?								_
	e of Upset											
Estin	nate What Pe	rcentas	ge of A	All the Ups	sets ar	e Due to:						
Onboard External	r RFI RFI RFI pecify)		_	······································	Equip	ing oment Fail own Source	иге		-			

5.0 CRITICALLY OF UPSETS

5.1 Passenger RFI

How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Passenger RFI: 4,2,4,3,2,5,2,2,5,4,2:

Average

= 3.2

Standard Deviation

= 1.3

Normal		Nuisance		Concern		Procedures		Injuries Damage		Catastrophic Total Loss	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Comment: Could be a 10 on a CAT III approach.

5.2 Onboard Systems RFI

How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Onboard RFI: 3,6,3,2,5,2,5,3,5,4,2,4,3,4,2,4,5,2,10,10,2,2,4,5,10,7,5,4,0,10,6:

Average

= 4.5

Standard Deviation

= 2.6

Normal		Nuisance		Concern		Emergency Procedures		Injuries Damage		Catastrophic Total Loss
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

5.3 External RFI (HIRF)

How Critical Are The Upsets Due to External RFI (HIRF): 5,6,5,2,8,5,10,7,2,4,1,10,1,5,10,8,4,10,4,4,10,4:

Average

= 5.7

Standard Deviation

= 3.0

Normal		Nuisance		Concern		Emergency Procedures		Injuries Damage		Catastrophic Total Loss
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

5.4 Lightning

How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Lighting: 6,5,6,2,6,4,6,6,2,3,5,6,10,8,4,4,4,5,10,8,10,5,4,5,10,7;

Average

= 5.7

Standard Deviation

= 2.4

Normal		Nuisance		Concern		Emergency Procedures		Injuries Damage		Catastrophic Total Loss
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

5.5 Avionics Equipment Failure

How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Avionics Equipment Failure: 2,6,5,6,5,4,6,5,8,5,2,3,5,1,4,6,2,2,6,4,5,10,8,4,5,

10: Average

= 5.0= 2.3

Standard Deviation

Normal		Nuisance		Concern		Emergency Procedures		Injuries		Catastrophic Total Loss
	******		*****	***************************************			*******	Damage		10fm F088
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

5.6 Unknown Source

How Critical Are The Upsets Due to Unknown Sources: 2,4,6,4,6,4,10,3,5,4,5,2,5,10,4,4,3,4,2,6:

Average = 4.7 Standard Deviation = 2.2

Normal		Nuisance		Concern		Emergency Procedures		Injuries Damage		Catastrophic Total Loss
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

APPENDIX C

STATISTICAL RELATIONSHIPS

C.1 Introduction

In the case of large samples, (n > 100), simple computations of means and standard deviations are probably sufficient for the objectives of this study. If the sample size is small, (n < 10), means and deviations suffice, however, there will probably be considerable dispersion of the data. When the sample size is between these two extremes, some additional sophistication in statistical analysis is warranted. Two such statistical tools will be used in a few cases in this report, correlation and rejection of outliers. These methods are briefly introduced in the following two sections.

C.2 Correlation Calculations

Sometimes two sets of data are assumed to be related (based on hypothesis, prior results, etc.) and we wish to study the validity of the assumption. For example, suppose we wish to study the relationship between the grades of a group of n students on the midterm exam (x_1, x_2, x_n) and the grades on the final exam (y_1, y_2, y_n) in a course. If we plot the grades for each student on a set of Cartesian coordinates, we can study the degree of correlation. If the grades are highly correlated, then they would approximately fall on a straight line through the origin at 45 degrees. The degree of correlation can be measured by computing the sample correlation coefficient r. Perfect correlation is r = 1, where the points all fall on the 45 degree line. If r = 0, there is no correlation and the points fall on a horizontal straight line. We can develop a formula for r in terms of various moments of x and y, [Crow 1960, Freund 1973].

We begin by listing the following well known moment formulas:

mean of
$$x - \overline{x} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i$$
 (C.1)

mean of
$$y - \overline{y} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i$$
 (C.2)

standard deviation of $x = S_x =$

$$\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - \overline{x})^2 / n^2}$$
 (C.3)

Expansion of Eq. (C.3) and simplification leads to another form which is computationally simpler:

$$S_{x} - \sqrt{\left[n\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i}^{2} - \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i}\right)^{2}\right]/n^{2}}$$
 (C.4)

And similarly for y

$$S_{y} = \sqrt{\left[n\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_{i}^{2} - \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_{i}\right)^{2}\right]} / n^{2}$$
 (C.5)

The covariance of x and y is defined as

$$cov(x,y) - \left[\sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - \overline{x}) (y_i - \overline{y}) \right] / n^2$$
 (C.6)

If the formulas are corrected for bias [see Shooman 1990, p.83, Crow 1960, p. 12], the denominators in Eqs. C.4,5,6 become (n)(n-1) instead of n^2 , which is an important correction for small sample sizes. The sample correlation coefficient is defined as the ratio of the covariance to the product of the standard deviations.

$$r - cov(x,y)/S_x S_y$$
 (C.7)

A BASIC program was written based on these formulas to compute the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficient for the data in this report.

Clearly, correlations of 0.98 and 0.99 represent high correlations and those of 0.05 and 0.1 represent very low correlation. However, how are we to interpret values in between. Freund [p. 427] gives a useful test of the hypothesis that samples are correlated vs. the null hypothesis that they are

uncorrelated. It can be shown that acceptance of the null hypothesis is governed by the t distribution where:

$$t = r\sqrt{n-2} / \sqrt{1-r^2}$$
 (C.8)

and the t distribution has n-2 degrees of freedom. The quantity n is the number of samples in the correlation analysis. For the correlation calculations in Table 6.5, n = 6 and solving Eq. (C.8) for r yields:

$$r - t/\sqrt{4 + r^2}$$
 (C.9)

From the t distribution table [Freund, p.], for n - 2 = 4 degrees of freedom and a confidence level of 10%, the value of t = 1.533. Substitution in Eq. (C.9) yields a value for r of 0.608. The conclusion is that responses in Table 6.5 with a value of r >= 0.608 have a probability of 0.1 or less of having occurred by chance from uncorrelated data. Thus, we will consider responses with r >= 0.608 as significantly correlated.

C.3 Statistical Rejection of Outliers

In many cases one value in a set of n data values $(x_1, x_2, ..., x_n)$ seems to be too large (small) as compared with the remaining body of data. Of course there is always a probability that the point in question does belong to the distribution represented by the other (n-1) values, and is only an extreme data point. Thus, it is useful to devise statistical tests which determine the probability that all the n values belong to the same distribution (the working hypothesis, H) as opposed to the probability that the one large value belongs to a different distribution then the other (n-1) values (the alternate hypothesis, \overline{H}).

The test statistic which is used in many such tests is best explained by assuming that the n observations are arranged in ascending order, where x_1 is the smallest and x_n the largest (i.e. the value in question). [Barnett, p. 52] We then compute a test statistic T = (numerator)/(denominator) = N/D. The numerator is a measure of the separation of the n'th observation from the remainder of the sample, and the denominator is a measure of the spread of the sample. As an example, for N one

might consider the separation between samples n and (n-1), i.e. $x_n - x_{n-1}$, and for D the range of the group, $x_n - x_1$. This is only illustrative, and other choices for N and D are possible.

In Barnett [Sec. 3.4.2], 16 tests for outliers (also called discordancy) in a set of gamma (including exponential) samples are presented. If we assume that the time of occurrence of an EMI event is exponentially distributed, then Epstein [1953] has shown that the sampling distribution of the occurrence rate (occurrences/hour) is chi-square. This result should also apply to the frequency/year and the frequency/flight values given in Table 6.8. It is also true that the gamma distribution becomes the chi-square distribution when the gamma parameter $\beta = 2$. Thus we can use one of Barnett's gamma tests with $\beta = 2$ to test the data of Table 6.8 for outliers.

The outlier test we will use from Barnett sets T = outlier value/sum of observations,

$$T - x_n / \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$$

The test leads to a procedure where the test statistic is compared with values from an F distribution table. We illustrate the procedure by testing the data in Table 6.8. Suppose that we suspect that the value of 32.4 for respondent #27 is an outlier among the other values of frequency of occurrence given in the table. Computing T we obtain

$$T = 32.4/(0+0+0+0.61+...+10+32.4)$$

$$T = 32.4/60.93 = 0.5318$$

The critical value for 99% probability of an outlier (1% critical value) is given on page 290 of Barnett for β =2 and n = 12 is 0.3428 < 0.5318. Thus, 32.4 is much too high to be considered from the same distribution as the other 11 respondents and should be dropped. We can now test the next largest value, 10, to see if it should be included with the other 10 values. Calculating our new T = 10/(60.93) = 32.4) = 0.3505 we see that this is less than 0.3681, the 1% critical value obtained by interpolation from the table, thus we accept the value of 10.

We can use this same test on the data in the frequency per year column of Table 6.8 to test weather respondent #23's value of 5.0 is an outlier.

$$T = 5/(0+0 + ... + 2.0+5.0) = 5/10.55 = 0.4739$$

The value given in the table for n = 15 is 0.2882. (The correct value for n = 16 could be obtained by

interpolation values in the table and would be slightly smaller). Thus, the value of 5 should be rejected. Continuing as before, we now test the next value which is 2. The new value of T = 2/(10.55 - 5) = 0.3604 > 0.2882, thus 2 is also rejected. Testing the third value, 1, we have T = 1/(5.55 - 2) = 0.2817 < 0.2882, (the correct value for n = 14 could be obtained by interpolation values in the table and would be slightly larger), thus this value should be accepted. The means and standard deviations are recalculated after dropping the rejected values and the results appear in the footnotes to Table 6.8.

C.4 Interval Estimates

To establish an interval estimate on statistical data one must first know the probability distribution of the estimate. We have assumed that all the occurrence rates were constant. (There is no reason to believe otherwise, and there is insufficient data to support models with a varying occurrence rate). It has been shown by Epstein [1953] that the sample distribution for a constant occurrence rate has a chi-square (χ^2) distribution. Specifically $2r = 2nT\lambda$ has a chi-square distribution, where r is the number of observed occurrences, n is the size of the observed population, T is the length of the observation period, and λ is the occurrence rate, where the lower confidence band has 2r degrees of freedom and the upper confidence bound has 2r + 2 degrees of freedom. Simple charts have been computed where the multiplier of the mean time between occurrences at the upper and lower conficence levels is plotted versus r for various confidence levels, [see Shooman 1990]. From these charts we find that for 10 occurrences of HIRF for pilots, the 80% confidence interval for the mean time between occurrences is 0.7 × mean to 1.7 × mean. Since the occurrence rates are the reciprocal of the mean time between occurrences, the required multipliers are the reciprocals of 0.7 and 1.7, ie. 0.59 and 1.43. Thus for pilot HIRF occurrence rate of 0.53/thousand, the interval estimate becomes 0.53/1.7 = 0.31 and 0.53/0.7 = 0.76. Similarly for the 4 occurrences of HIRF for passengers, the occurrence rates become 0.56/2.2 = 0.25 to 0.56/0.6 = 0.93.

APPENDIX D - DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS

If we examine Table D.1 we see that 24 of the 57 respondents provided event descriptions in Sec. 6.0. I have reproduced these descriptions verbatim in Table D.1. Note that if a respondent described three events they are listed as Event 1, Event 2, Event 3.

Response 6 6 6 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11

			TABLE D.1 DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS (see Sec. 6)
Response #	Source 1		Description
15	PO, SP, SD, O	Event 1: Wide	Wide and narrow bodies - Threats were from military aircraft outside U.S. airspace.
		Event 2: Helion	Helicopter, threats were Russian ship radar in open sea and illegal CB radio (high power) in Southern U.S.
		Event 3: Airshi	Airship (blimp), ignition on the ponsch engine used for pwn.
		Event 4: Light	Light transport, TV station interference with radios over Oakland, CA. Freq. 108.2 MHz.
		Event 5: Comb	Combat aircraft, threat was VOA on border between Russia and W. Germany
		Event 6: Porta	Portable tape player/upset duplicated in aircraft manufacturer's labs. ILS Receiver. Radio frequency interference effecting an aircraft system caused by passenger equipment operating inside the aircraft.
		Event 7: Coun	Countermeasures Equipment on military airplanes effecting systems on commercial aircraft in vicinity.
		Event 8: High	High frequency transmitter effects autopilot on a narrowbody.
		Event 9: Instru	Event 9: Instrument panel light circuit affecting magnetic compass. Fix was to reroute supply wires and place aluminum foil around glare shield and shield supply wires.
		Event 10: Soun head	Event 10: Sources: Voice of America transmitter, military radar, shipboard military radar, ECM & jammer equipment. Effects: communications equipment in headset from VOA, Helicopter flight controls, Panel lights - brake warning, windshield heat, automated landing gear-brake, ECM equipment.
		Event 11: Light rock	Event 11: Lightning on ground strike ADF & VOR effected. There is an Air Force report of a missle being fired due to lightning; there is a NASA report of sounding rocket being launched due to lightning.
16		Event 1: Airca Four	Aircraft modified to install HF transceiver. When transmitter keyed control surfaces moved. Modulation on the HF carrier coupled to flight control wiring. Found during pre-flight safety checks.
		Event 2: Airci	Aircraft struck by lightning. Pitol static probe heater wiring carried current to main structure. Heater wire burned in to causing radar radome to burst. Aircraft landed safely.
		Event 3: Pron	Promity switches failed on landings. Landing gear prox switches were susceptible to HIRF (field levels 1700 v/m). Switch qualified to 200 v/m.
17	PO	Event 1: With	Within 10 min of take-off the passenger cabin oxygen masks deployed, estimated altitude = 10-11,000 ft. Pilot opted to return to airport and passengers were transferred to another flight. No injuries or trauma resulted as the aircraft was approximately on 25% occupied during the event.
18	PO	Event 1: Pilot rada	Pilot complaint: when keyed UHF radio radar antenna slued violently making A/C difficult to handle. I observed the problem by operating the UHF when the radar system and antenna was active. It was discovered the antenna syncros were susceptible to the UHF radio. A fix was installed. The incidents have not recurred in the last 10 years.
21	PO, SP, SD	Event 2: Dur	During 8.4.5.6.7, used experimental aircraft to make lightning cloud penetrations into thunderstorms. When struck wx radar normally went blank and in 1 or 2 sweeps, returned to normal oper. during exercise, normally had radio static
23	PO. SP	Event 1: -60'	-60% of the problems we have experienced at Boeing have been due to coupling of the HF communications transmitted signal into unshielded signal lines on the vehicle. This results in digital signal upset and noise in audio circuits. This is basically due to the aircraft and its cabling being resonant at these frequencies.
- 2004, 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -		Event 2: "35	~35% of the problems we have experienced have been due to low frequency (i.e. 400 Hz) coupling into audio circuits. Again primarily due to poor wiring practices (wisting, shielding, roofing, etc.). With the use of modern digital audio systems these problems have diminished considerably.
		Event 3: Mos mal	Most passenger accommodation systems (i.e. cabin lights, call buttons, intercom, etc.) are not designed to withstand lightning strike transient without malfunction. In fact on most aircraft only flight essential avionics will survive a lightning strike without a transient performance interruption. This is probably proper cost-effective design.

TABLE D.1 DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS (see Sec. 6)	Description	Event 1: In over 20 years of flying flight tests of avionics I have observed many cases of interference to many different radio systems from other on-board equipment and external RFI from AM, FM, and television stations.	Event 2: While fiving in southeastern Georgia in IFR conditions in an aircraft without weather radar, I got into an embedded thunderstorm with nearly continuous lightning discharges all around the aircraft. At this time the engine driven alternator quit, the ammeter went to zero. In about 2 minutes (it seemed much longer) I had passed through the thunderstorm cell and broke out into clear air. I landed to get the alternator fixed and maintenance found all the diodes in the alternator burned out.	Event 1: (All 3 incidents were basically the same and as described as Event 1 below): light transport in normal cruise at +30,000° ah. Weather radar was turned on and working property. Whenever an in-flight phone call was made, weather radar would either blank it's display or paint the entire display a solid color. As soon as the phone call was completed, radar display would return to normal.	Event 1: Turbo fan transport/rotation at takeoff/Teterboro, NJ/daytime low overcast/ maint. assumed good - new a/c unreliable symbol generator source-to-display tube select logic/condition reproduced on bench and analyzed/effect was total loss of all primary displays in critical flight regime/a/c entered IFR in this condition - crew had to return for landing on standbys - did not think or know to cycle breakers which clears problem.	Event 2: Turbo fan transport/level cruise/(other than cruise) unknown flt. conditions/ unknown location/unknown weather/assumed good maint new a/c/two different avionics units connected to central comm. data bus went unstable in their bus interface hardware and caused bus to be "blinded"/faulty units were returned and tested/analyzed/effect was rapid and intermittent loss of displayed parameters, air data parameters, loss of auto pilot, multiple and rapid data fail flag oscillations/pilot loss of confidence in primary displays while bus is blinded - had to resort to standbys, essential level no no.	Event 3: Bomber/level cruise/ northern US/ clear wx/ assumed good maint/ YAW damper channel induced rudder kicks/ YD replaced which solved problem/effect was intermittent and sometimes severe kicks of rudder (and pedals). YAW damper had to be powered down/criticality? Maybe could have damaged vert stab, rudder or fuselage, but kicking pedal liked to smash knees into the yoke!	Event 1: Twin-turbo prop transport, take-off, Puerto Rico, good weather, good maintenance, trim out of whack on alteron caused by pilot error, caused severe roll and loss of altitude. Pilot was able to regain control, but a crash was certain!	Event 1: Many examples of intrasystem and intersystem EMI during EMC and EMV tests.	Event 1: Too difficult a task for 15,000 flight hours.	Event 1: Lightning strike narrowbody knocked out all F/O instruments plus several electrical busses. Aircraft near thunderstorm in Kansas. Most instruments eventually restored.	Event 2: Failure of all navigation instruments. Electrical bus failures at night in level light. Cockpit near totally dark. Some instruments later restored. Fortunate this was night VFR.	Event 3: Auto land in narrowbody. A/C pitched down violently (nose down) just as flare initiated. Day VFR. PHL airport.	Event 1: Had White House Secret Service agents on board w/special telephone. They called White House after notifying me - no problems with any instruments on board my aircraft during telephone usage.	Event 2. I've had lightning strikes on a few occasions - no troubles of any kind after strikes.	Event 1: 4.2 RFI incident: wide body a/c. Happened about 4:30 in to an 8:00 flt, when using #1 HF to make enroute position report. Tried other HF - did not occur. I attributed it to shielding on #1 HF transmitter lead to common antenna breaking down, after use for several hours. This happened just last month, lst of my experience.	Event 1: Narrowbody banked sharply and dropped 20,000".
	Source 1	PO		PO	PO. SP, SD			SP. SD	PO	PO	PO			<u>8</u>		PO	SP
	Response #	8		24	72			30	32	33	\$			33		38	40

			TABLE D.1 DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS (see sec. 9)
	Response #	Source 1	Description
	3 5	PO, SP	Event 1: HF transmissions corrupted engine oil pressure sensor output data (weather & flight conditions were irrelevant). Established cause: oil pressure sensor susceptible to HF RF-fields. The problem led to an imposed operational limitation on the use of HF-comm. Pending a final solution. The problem has highlighted a potential HIRF problem if left unsolved. Solution has been to implement interface filtering at sensor.
			Event 2: Ground maintenance crew using hand-held UHF-comm, transmitters caused upset to elevator feel control system. EFC showed susceptible to UHF RF-fields. These could cause nuisance fault status-indication and reposition the system. This would lead to flight deck annunciated alerts. Solution was to implement interface filtering at connector.
			Event 3: Airflow in engine air intake duct (a plastic part) led to ESD discharges, caused by air and/or rain particles impacting on/in the duct. Subsequent ESD discharges caused upset to engine anti-ice system. Consequently in accordance with flight procedures aircraft must evade icing conditions upon a deicing fault annunciation. Problem was solved by an improved bonding of the air duct, which prevents a charge build up.
	55	PO	Event 1: During descent into a very busy airport (ORD) all electronic displays onboard abruptly dumped! The aircraft twin-turbofan airliner has extensive electronics and all of them died except for backup controls and indicators. The aircraft remained controllable due to redundancy and the weather was clear. Had the weather been bad and had we been in the transition phase of flight (from approach to landing) the situation would've become dangerous.
96			Event 2: During descent phase into an airport heavy thunderstorm activity surrounded the aircraft. We were penetrating an area of little or no activity but had cells in close proximity. The area had nearly continuous discharge but no affect was observed on the aircraft. Suddenly we were subjected to a discharge very nearby. The lightning did not strike the aircraft but our weather radar blanked it's current sweep, then resumed but left the first portion of it's screen blank until the return sweep. Subsequent operation was normal.
2	Se	PO	Event 1: HF transmitter interference into autopilot caused up to 75% travel of collective varied with pitch of modulating voice and transmit frequency caused by poor design which installed autopilot junction block in vicinity of HF antenna coupler on UH-IN - potentially very dangerous
-			Event 2: HF transmitter interference with analog engine governor controls caused engine to surge. Varied with frequency, unaffected by extra modulation. UHF common interference with instruments, erp fuel qty. Panel lights interfere with instr, due to common ground.
			Event 3: P-STATIC buildup (esp during operation in snow or sand) has caused loss of comm and nav capability per several reliable operator reports.

1. PO = Personal Observation; SP = Report from a Second Party; SD = Study of Data; O = Other.

Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, galtiering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Contractor Report **April 1994** 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS A Study of Occurrence Rates of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) G NAG1-1272 to Aircraft With a Focus on HIRF (External) High Intensity Radiated Fields WU 505-64-10 6. AUTHOR(S) Martin L. Shooman 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Polytechnic University School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Dept. of Computer Science Long Island Campus, Rt. 110 Farmingdale, NY 11735 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER National Aeronautics and Space Administration Langley Research Center Hampton, VA 23681-0001 NASA CR-194895 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Langley Grant Monitor: Felix L. Pitts Final Report 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Unclassified-Unlimited Subject Category 03 13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This report presents the methodology and results of a subjective study done by Polytechnic University to investigate Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) events on aircraft. The results cover various types of EMI from on-board aircraft systems, passenger carry-on devices, and externally generated disturbances. The focus of the study, however, was on externally generated EMI, termed High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF), from radars, radio and television transmitters, and other man-made emitters of electromagnetic energy. The study methodology used an anonymous questionnaire distributed to experts to gather the data. This method is known as the Delphi or Consensus Estimation technique. The questionnaire was sent to an expert population of 230 and there were 57 respondents. Details of the questionnaire, a few anecdotes, and the statistical results of the study are presented.

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